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INTRODUCTION
Perhaps we have come full circle. At-large districting
schemes, once legally suspect for compromising the voting rights
of minorities, have gained a new acceptability among some civil
rights activists. Social science and legal research indicate that,
when linked with semi-proportional voting systems, at-large
plans can provide fair access to protected groups, thereby
passing judicial scrutiny under the provisions of the federal
Voting Rights Act.' In fact, under certain circumstances, courts
have found these modified at-large systems preferable to single-
member districts, which were long considered appropriate
remedies to plans that denied effective representation to minori-
ty voters.2
Undoubtedly, the growing interest in semi-proportional
voting systems is partly attributable to the recent notoriety of
Professor Lani Guinier. Her spectacular fall from grace with
the Clinton administration, occasioned by the withdrawal of her
' The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1(1988)).
2 See Richard L. Cole & Delbert A. Taebel, Cumulative Voting in Local
Elections: Lessons from the Alamogordo Experience, 73 Soc. SCI. Q. 194 (1992);
Richard L. Engstrom & Charles J. Barrilleaux, Native Americans and Cumu-
lative Voting: The Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux, 72 SOC. SCI. Q. 388 (1991).
1994] SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 201
nomination for Assistant Attorney General, has provided her
with a national forum in which to air some innovative and
timely ideas on cumulative voting that were once confined to the
pages of scholarly journals.' Ultimately, however, the U.S.
Supreme Court's recent decision in Shaw v. Reno is more
significant.4 By ruling against a practice in North Carolina
described by some as a form of racial gerrymandering, the Court
may have set a new limit on the use of districting as a remedy
for illegal voting practices and has certainly underscored the
need to explore alternatives to the single-member district as a
solution to unfair election procedures. Modified at-large plans
provide viable options.
A turn-of-the-century reform movement, organized to reduce
the power that party bosses held in American cities, produced
the original at-large election systems. Reformers believed that
selecting local officials through at-large systems would make
elections more visible and open to scrutiny, thus undermining
the ward-based mechanism of nomination that assured the
outcome of most contests.5 Though municipal corruption was
indeed a reality of city life, the reform program camouflaged a
class conflict and served to undermine the governmental access
the party machine provided to immigrants and ethnic minori-
ties.' With the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, and
the U.S. Justice Department's more vigorous enforcement of
constitutional guarantees at the polls, at-large systems came
under close examination. Through the aid of sophisticated
social science techniques, these systems were often identified as
3 See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATiVE DEMOCRACY (1994); Lani Guinier, Who's Afraid
of Lani Guinier? N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 27, 1994, at p.41, col. 1.
4 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
5 See CHARLES BEARD, AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT (1912); FRANK J.
GOODNOW, CITY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1910); ERNEST GRIF-
FITH, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY GoVERNMENT, 1900-1920 (1974); WILLIAM
B. MuNRo, THE GOVERNMENT OF AMERICAN CITIES (1926); Samuel P. Hays,
The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era, 55
PAC. Nw. Q. 157 (1974); Joseph P. Viteritti, The City and the Constitution: A
Historical Analysis of Institutional Evolution and Adaptation, 12 J. URB. AFF.
221 (1990).
6 See MELVIN HOLLI, REFORM IN DETROIT: HAZEN S. PINGREE AND URBAN
POLITICS (1969); JON C. TEAFORD, THE UNHERALDED TRIUMPH: CITY GOVERN-
MENT IN AMERICA, 1870-1900 (1984); JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE
IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1968).
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mechanisms for diluting the voting strength of minority popu-
lations.7 As a result of court action during the 1970s, many
cities-including San Antonio and Fort Worth, Texas, Charlotte
and Raleigh, North Carolina, and Mobile, Alabama-changed
their election systems from at-large to single-member plans.
Nevertheless, the single-member district schemes imposed by
the courts to rectify historic abuses carried their own limitations
and problems. First, these schemes build on the sometimes
untrue assumption that protected groups are geographically
concentrated. More generally, arbitrary assumptions about the
nature, composition, and location of group interests in and
among political communities inform single-member systems.
Most significantly, single-district systems perpetuate the need
for local districting, which at its core involves an exercise in
political accommodation and manipulation often designed to
protect those already in power.' Experimentation with semi-
proportional voting systems has provided a reasonable alterna-
tive that may result in combined benefits of single-district and
at-large systems. This article traces the evolution of the Voting
Rights Act, demonstrating how the integration of legal analysis
and social science research has influenced both the interpreta-
tion and enforcement of voting laws over the last three decades.
The article is an illustrative study of how methodological inno-
vation in the field of political science has allowed the judiciary
to respond to one of the most vital issues in the American
political process. Additionally, the article shows how the well-
intentioned implementation of these techniques has sometimes
become an end in itself, thus undermining the original goals of
fair and effective representation.
Part I presents the legislative history of the Voting Rights
Act. Following a long period of judicial restraint, aggressive
legislative action by the President and Congress finally led to a
consensus among the three branches of government to interpret
and enforce voting rights in a positive way. Part II begins with
7 See BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE
QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 61-108 (1992) [hereinafter QUEST FOR VOTING
EQUALITY]; Richard L. Engstrom & Michael D. McDonald, Quantitative
Evidence in Vote Dilution Litigation: Political Participation and Polarized
Voting, 17 URB. LAW. 369 (1985); James W. Loewen & Bernard Grofman,
Recent Developments in Methods Used in Vote Dilution Cases, 21 URE. LAW.
589 (1989).
8 See Bruce Cain, Assessing the Partisan Effects of Districting, 79 AM. POL.
SCI. REv. 320 (1985); Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy
through Legislative Districting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 541 (1994).
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an overview of the social science literature which helped to
define the initial consensus; advancing the goal of equality from
a set of abstract concepts to an empirically defined set of stan-
dards. This section shows how use of these standards would
allow the courts to identify violations of the law and to craft
remedies to existing violations. An examination of more recent
empirical evidence indicates, however, that the practice of
creating "safe districts" through apportionment does not ad-
vance the interests of all minorities and works to the advantage
of African-Americans only under certain conditions. Part III
provides a critical examination of single-member districting
schemes, highlighting the limitations of racial gerrymandering
as a judicial strategy to improve the representation of minorities
and making a case for the wider use of semi-proportional sys-
tems, particularly cumulative voting. This section reviews both
relevant case law and the available social science evidence,
arguing that although cumulative voting does not resolve the
dilemma of protecting minority interests in a majoritarian
system, it serves to modify the ill effects of majority rule.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE DEFINITIONS OF
VOTING RIGHTS
A. A RELUCTANT JUDICIARY
Voting rights in the United States are protected by the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The
Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, granted citizenship to
persons born or naturalized in the United States and extended
federal safeguards against the infringement of constitutional
rights by the states.9 The Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in
1870, explicitly prohibited racial discrimination in voting.'0 By
1871, Congress had passed two Enforcement Acts designed to
bolster the new constitutional protections." However, subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions made it clear that the federal
"No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CoNST. amend. XV, § 1.
"0 "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §1.
" Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27; Civil Rights Act of 1870, 16 Stat.
144.
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judiciary did not intend to aggressively intervene in Southern
politics on behalf of black voters.'
Segregationists were quite inventive in their determination
to obstruct the black franchise. Specific race-based prohibitions
on black voting were unnecessary so long as devices such as
white primaries, literacy tests, and poll taxes could accomplish
the same purpose. Due to the noble efforts of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, some mod-
est and temporary judicial victories were achieved during the
first half of this century." Given the steadfast reluctance of
the courts to enter the "political thicket,"'4 however, a century
passed before the post-Civil War provisions of the Constitution
would have any importance to aggrieved parties. In 1946,
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote his famous majority opinion
explaining that congressional districting clearly was out of
bounds for the judiciary and should be left to the legislative
branch. 5 A year later, the Supreme Court refused to hear a
case by the same Illinois plaintiff concerning state legislative
districting, declaring lack of jurisdiction. 6
The tide began to turn in 1962, when the Supreme Court
accepted jurisdiction for a case brought by urban residents in
Tennessee challenging the state's failure to reapportion legisla-
tive seats in accordance with population changes. Writing for a
12 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); United States v. Reese,
92 U.S. 214 (1876).
13 The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional an Oklahoma literacy test
in Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), but the decision was soon
undermined with the passage of subsequent state legislation. After two
decades of litigation, the Supreme Court finally struck down a Texas primary
law as an integral and impermissible part of the election process in Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
14 Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
15 Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). It was here that Justice
Frankfurter wrote in response to the plaintiffs action, "To sustain this action
would cut very deep into the very being of Congress. Courts ought not to enter
the political thicket. The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State
legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of
Congress."
16 Colgrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947). Later, there were several
successful challenges to voting arrangements in the South based on Constitu-
tional grounds. For example, in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), the Su-
preme Court struck down the exclusion of blacks from party primaries as a
violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960), the Court invalidated an alteration of city boundaries that excluded
almost four hundred black voters.
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6-2 majority, Justice William J. Brennan based this landmark
decision on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.17 Because of its focus on malapportionment, this
case was also instrumental in changing the focus of litigation
from access to the more complex issue of representation. In a
subsequent decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren would declare,
"ITIhe weight of a citizen's vote cannot be made to depend on
where he lives."'"
The former Chief Justice believed that the accumulated
impact of these voting rights cases, fifteen in all, was the most
significant legacy of the Warren Court. 9 Notwithstanding
their profound effect on American political life, these decisions
provided future plaintiffs with rather vague guidelines for
litigation. The Court did not specify how equal participation in
elections should be achieved and left the job of fashioning relief
to the federal district courts. This provided an impetus for
Congress to pass the Voting Rights Act a year later.2"
'i Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). While this case specifically dealt
with the apportionment of state legislative seats, the Supreme Court subse-
quently applied the Fourteenth Amendment to set standards for general-
purpose local governments and school districts. See East Carroll Parish Sch.
Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S.
50 (1970); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). For commentary on
the case, see M. DAVm GELFAND, FEDERAL CoNsTITUIoNAL LAW AND AMERI-
CAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 10-16 (1984); Stanley Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr:
The New Doctrine of Judicial Intervention and its Implications for American
Federalism, 29 U. CM. L. REV. 673 (1962); Robert G. McCloskey, The Reappor-
tionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1962); Thomas I. Emerson,
Malapportionment and Judicial Power, 72 YALE L.J. 64, 65 (1962).
1" Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964). Prior to this case, the
Supreme Court explicitly had applied the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments to prohibit vote dilution on the basis of race or gender in Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
19 See G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 337 (1982). In a
similar vein, President Lyndon B. Johnson assessed the Voting Rights Act as
the most significant legislative accomplishment of his administration. See
Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act:A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES
IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 7 (Bernard
Grofinan & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) [hereinafter CONTROVERSIES IN
MINORITY VOTING].
20 Congress had passed Civil Rights Acts in 1957, 1960 and 1964. These
laws relied heavily on long-term litigation at the district-court level as a
means for enforcement. The process proved to be burdensome for plaintiffs and
generally ineffective. See Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the
Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523 (1973); Barry Hawk & J.J. Kirby, Federal
Protection of Voting Rights, 51 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1965).
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B. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 196521
1. Major Provisions
In March 1965, eight days after the American people wit-
nessed the public beating of black and white marchers by Selma
police, President Lyndon Johnson went on national television to
urge the passage of new legislation. On August 6 of the same
year, the Voting Rights Act was signed into law. This legisla-
tion, as amended over the years, prohibits both overt barriers to
registration and electoral arrangements that dilute the voting
power of protected groups. It also authorizes the Justice De-
partment to take direct administrative action on behalf of
plaintiffs, thereby avoiding the usual obstructions found in the
Southern courts.
In its original form, Section 4 of the Act set down criteria to
determine which states or counties would be covered by its
special provisions during a temporary five-year period. These
provisions would take effect in a jurisdiction if, as of November
1, 1964, the district used a test or devise as a precondition for
voting, less than fifty percent of the voting-age population was
registered to vote, or less than fifty percent of the voting-age
population actually voted. Under these provisions, all tests in
the involved jurisdictions were suspended for five years.22
According to Section 5 of the Act, any jurisdiction covered by the
criteria specified in the law would be required to acquire
"preclearance" from the Justice Department or the U.S. District
Court in Washington, D.C., before changing its voting practices
or procedures. 21 Under Sections 6 through 8, the Justice De-
partment could deploy federal examiners and observers to
locations it deemed necessary. Section 9 detailed procedures for
challenging eligibility lists created by federal registrars.
21 The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971, 1973 to 1973 bb-1 (1988)).
22 The states originally covered under this trigger mechanism were
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina (in part), South
Carolina and Virginia.
' The significance of this provision was made clear in Allen v. State Bd. of
Educ., 393 U.S. 544 (1969), when the Court, applying the provision to strike
down an at-large election system for county supervisors in Mississippi, found
that the new system served to dilute black votes. The Court later reaffirmed
the broad construction of Section 5 in Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379
(1971).
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In 1970, Congress extended the temporary provisions of the
Act for five years. In 1975, these provisions were extended
another seven years, the coverage formula was expanded to
include any jurisdiction falling under the above criteria as of
November 1, 1972, and literacy tests were permanently elimi-
nated. The most significant feature of the 1975 legislation was
the inclusion of language minorities (including Alaskan natives,
Native Americans, Asian Americans, and people of Hispanic
heritage) as protected classes. If a jurisdiction conducted
registration or elections in English only and five percent of its
population was composed of a protected-language group, the
jurisdiction fell under Section 4 criteria.2
2. Initial Interpretations
Several months after the passage of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, the Supreme Court went beyond the issue of
malapportionment in defining vote dilution. While the Court re-
jected a claim by Georgia plaintiffs that multi-member legisla-
tive districts are inherently unconstitutional, it found that such
systems might be deemed illegal if they operated to "minimize
or cancel out voting strength . ,,2' Thus the decision opened
the door for more creative evidentiary presentations on behalf of
aggrieved parties. In 1971, the Court refused to strike down a
multi-member district in Marion County, Indiana, on the basis
of evidence indicating that the number of black legislators was
not proportionate to minority membership in the population.
In reversing a District Court finding of vote dilution, the Su-
preme Court ruled that the issue is not whether blacks lost in
this particular contest but whether they lost because ghetto
dwellers had "less opportunity ... to participate in the political
processes and to elect legislators of their choice."27  The Court
' The extension of coverage to language minorities broadened the law's
reach beyond the South and into the West and Southwest. States covered
would now include Alaska, Arizona and Texas, as well as parts of California,
Colorado, Florida and South Dakota. The Bronx, Brooklyn and Manhattan in
New York were added under the 1970 Amendments. See David H. Hunter, The
1975 Voting Rights Act and Language Minorities, 25 CATH. U. L. REV. 250
(1976).
' Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965). See Burns v. Richardson,
484 U.S. 73 (1966).
26 Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971).
27Id.
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seemed to send an unambiguous message that failure at the
polls constituted insufficient evidence of illegality. Plaintiffs
would need to demonstrate that political efficacy, or lack there-
of, was a function of discrimination. But what would constitute
such evidence? In 1973, a unanimous Supreme Court in White
v. Regester applied a "totality of circumstances" test to invali-
date multi-member legislative districts in San Antonio and
Dallas,28 accepting the "intensely local appraisal" utilized in
the District Court's findings, thus acknowledging specific factors
used by the plaintiffs to determine discrimination.29 The White
test provided lower courts with a standard under which to
review subsequent claims of voting violations. 0
With the passage of the Voting Rights Act, the courts began
to look beyond the overt denial of the franchise and focused on
electoral practices that undermine the ability of racial and
language minorities to elect representatives of their own choice.
Hence the standard of fairness was elevated from one of access
to one of meaningful participation, if not representation. At the
local level, multi-member districts and at-large elections re-
ceived particular attention. While the courts did not categori-
cally declare these systems unlawful, they became highly sus-
pect. The "totality of circumstances" concept became an essen-
tial part of the language of litigation. The promulgation of the
White3 and Zimmer32 standards left the impression that the
2 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973).
' Id. at 766. Among the factors considered were: the history of official
racial discrimination in Texas elections, the use of white primaries, poll taxes,
multi-member districts, white-controlled slating organizations, the use of
racial tactics in election campaigns, the absence of minority elected officials,
and the election of officials who were not sufficiently responsive to minority
interests.
0 One of the more notable decisions was handed down by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973).
What became known as the Zimmer factors included the following:
[W]here a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to the process
of slating candidates, the unresponsiveness of legislators to their
particular interests, a tenuous state policy underlying the prefer-
ence for multimember or at-large districting, or that the exercise of
past discrimination in general precludes the effective participation
in the electoral system, . . . the existence of at-large districts,
majority vote requirements, anti-single-shot voting provisions,and
the lack of provision for at-large candidates running from particular
geographical subdistricts.
Id. at 1305.
31 White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
1994] SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 209
courts were aggressively enforcing voting rights. That impres-
sion would change.
3. The Impact of City of Mobile v. Bolden
In 1980, in City of Mobile v. Bolden,33 the Supreme Court
upheld an at-large municipal election system in Alabama
because the plaintiffs failed to prove discriminatory intent. The
six-person majority reversed two lower court decisions accepting
the application of the White and Zimmer tests. Rejecting a find-
ing of discrimination based solely upon circumstantial evidence,
the Court held that the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the
voting law in question was enacted "because of," not merely "in
spite of," its adverse effect on minorities.34 Justice Potter
Stewart, reaching back to an 1875 decision for precedent, 5
reasoned that "the Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the
right of suffrage upon everyone. 136
The landmark decision laid down three basic principles that
could essentially set back the clock for voting rights: first, only
when evidence of purposeful discrimination exists can a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause be found; second, dispropor-
tionate effects alone provide inadequate grounds for claiming
vote dilution; and third, the Fourteenth Amendment does not
require proportional representation.
This decision made it clear to voting rights advocates that
they were losing ground in their struggle for equality of oppor-
tunity."7 By replacing the discriminatory-effect standard with
the more difficult intent test, the Court, in effect, increased the
burden of proof for plaintiffs seeking relief from discriminatory
election practices."8 The Court also shifted attention to the
32 Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973).
3 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
Bolden, 446 U.S. at 72.
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875).
3 6 Bolden, 446 U.S. at 62 (citing Reese, 92 U.S. at 217-18).
37 See Peyton McCrary, History in the Courts: The Significance of City of
Mobile v. Bolden, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 47 (Chandler Davidson ed.,
1984) [hereinafter MINORITY VOTE DILUTION]; James Blacksher & Lester
Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden, 34 HAsTINGS L.J.
1 (1982).
' The Supreme Court, by this time, already had imposed the intent
standard in several civil rights cases. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
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legislative branch, where civil rights activists would plead their
case through the political process. In 1982, Congress responded
by amending the Voting Rights Act.
4. 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act
The special provisions of the Voting Rights Act that had
been enacted in 1975 were scheduled to expire in August 1982.
The dramatic response to Bolden created the political momen-
tum to adopt a particularly strong version of the bill, which
President Reagan signed into law on June 23, 1982. The
amended law, in direct response to Bolden, established that
"proof of discriminatory intent is not required to establish a
violation,"3 9 and thus lessened the burden of proof for a party
bringing a claim in court.4" Section 2, as amended, stipulates:
a. No voting qualification or prerequisite ... be im-
posed or applied ... which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen to vote ... on
account of race or color ....
b. A violation... is established if, based on the totali-
ty of circumstances, it is shown that the political pro-
cesses leading to nomination or election ... are not
equally open to members of a class of citizens protected
... in that its members have less opportunity than
256 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The intent standard was
somewhat modified in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982), when the Court
ruled that discrimination could be inferred circumstantially from such factors
as historical discrimination, unresponsiveness of elected officials, and particu-
lar structural voting schemes. This decision was handed down two days after
Congress amended the Voting Rights Act. See Bernard Grofinan, Criteria for
Districting;A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter Criteria for Districting].
39 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY ON S. 1992, 97th Cong. 2d
Sess. [hereinafter SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITrEE REPORT]. See Samuel
Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833 (1992).
" See Armand Derfler, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Amendments
of 1982, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 37, at 145; Laughlin McDon-
ald, The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and Minority Representation, in
CONTROVERSIEs IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 19; Thomas M. Boyd & Ste-
phen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legisla-
tive History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (1983); Frank R. Parker, The
"Results" Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the Intent
Standard, 69 VA. L. REV. 715 (1983); Edwin J. Sebold, Applying Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act to Single-Member Offices, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2199 (1990).
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other members to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice.4'
The amended law extended the special provisions of the
original act for twenty-five years. Congress sought nothing less
than an assessment of the "totality of circumstances" inherent
in any election scheme in order to determine violations. Al-
though Section 2 allows the courts to consider, as one measure
of opportunity, the actual extent to which minorities have been
elected to office within a jurisdiction, the Voting Rights Act of
1982 stopped short of establishing a right to proportional repre-
sentation.
C. AN EMERGING CONSENSUS
1. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the
1982 version of the bill contains the most comprehensive explo-
ration of congressional intent regarding factors which warrant
review in voting rights cases. As a legislative response to
Bolden, Congress intended to recapture the standards originally
defined in White4" and Zimmer.' Although the listed factors
were intended to be neither exclusive nor exhaustive, factors
warranting review in voting rights cases are:
1. The extent of any history of official discrimination in
the state or political subdivision that touched the right
of members of the minority group to register to vote or
otherwise to participate in the democratic process;"
2. The extent to which voting in the elections of the
state or political subdivision is racially polarized;45
3. The extent to which the state or political subdivision
has used unusually large election districts, majority
voting requirements, anti-single-shot provisions, or
other voting practices or procedures that may enhance
41 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988)).
42 412 U.S 755 (1973).
43 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973).
44 SENATE JuDIcIARY COMMrTEE REPORT, supra note 39, at 28-29.
45 id.
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the opportunity for discrimination against the minority
group;
46
4. If there is a slating process, whether the members of
the minority group have been denied access to this pro-
cess;
47
5. The extent to which the members of the minority
group in the state or political subdivision bear the
effects of discrimination in such areas as education,
employment, and health care, which hinder their ability
to participate effectively in the political process;'
6. Whether political campaigns have been characterized
by overt or subtle racial appeals;49 and
7. The extent to which the members of the minority
group have been elected to public office in the jurisdic-
tion.5 °
Additional factors bearing probative value in some plaintiffs'
cases are:
1. Whether elected officials are significantly unrespon-
sive to the particularized needs of the members of the
minority;
51
2. Whether the state's or a political subdivision's use of
such voting-qualification prerequisite, or standard,
practice, or procedure rests on a tenuous underlying
policy.
52
2. Thornburg v. Gingles"3
Several years after the passage of the Voting Rights Act,
the Supreme Court accepted the above standards in unanimous-
ly striking down a North Carolina electoral system which had
set up five multi-member state legislative districts. In
Thornburg v. Gingles, the Court ruled that the District Court
had acted properly in utilizing the nine criteria appearing in the








53 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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discrimination in voting, education, housing, employment and
health services, as well as evidence that prior campaigns had
appealed to racial prejudice.5 4 The Supreme Court noted these
factors and their relevance to the plaintiff's claims, finding that
the "most important" factors were the "extent to which minority-
group members have been elected to public office in the jurisdic-
tion" and "the extent to which voting in elections of the state or
political subdivision have been racially polarized."55 Although
the Supreme Court voted unanimously to uphold the lower court
decision, the Court handed down four separate opinions. The
majority opinion set down three criteria for determining the
validity of a vote-dilution claim.5" This three-part test, which
would become the standard for reviewing challenged districting
schemes, includes the following factors:
1. The minority group must be able to demonstrate
that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact
to constitute a majority in a single-member district.
2. The minority group must be able to demonstrate
that it is politically cohesive.
3. The minority group must be able to demonstrate
that the white majority votes sufficiently as a block to
usually enable the majority to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate. 7
The majority devoted a significant portion of its decision to
defining "racial polarization," holding that polarization could be
proven by demonstrating a statistical correlation between race
and voter choice. The Court clearly stated that demonstrating
a causal relationship between race and voting patterns was not
necessary; a simple statistical correlation would suffice."8
Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984).
478 U.S. at 37.
56 Justices William Brennan, Harry Blackmun, Thurgood Marshall, John
Paul Stevens and Byron White formed the majority.
57 478 U.S. at 46-51.
' Id. at 62-63. For critical assessments of the Amendments and the Court's
interpretation of the law, see Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The
Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 90 MICH. L. REV.
1077 (1991) [hereinafter Triumph of Tokenism]; Timothy G. O'Rourke, The
1982 Amendments and the Voting Rights Paradox, in CONTROVERSIES IN
MINORITY VOTING, supra note 19, at 85; Abigail M. Thernstrom, The Odd
Evolution of the Voting Rights Act, 55 PUB. INT. 49 (1979); Alexander Athan
Yanos, Note, Reconciling the Right to Vote with the Voting Rights Act, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 1810 (1992) [hereinafter Reconciling the Right to Vote].
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A growing consensus between the Congress and the Court
to pursue an activist approach to the definition and enforcement
of voting rights emerged from Gingles. This consensus resulted,
for the first time, in a set of standards for evaluating existing
laws and practices. Putting these standards into effect required
the support of sophisticated empirical tests.59 As these tests
became more methodologically and statistically advanced, they
influenced both the interpretation and the implementation of
the law.
II. SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
A. OVERVIEW
The central role elections play in the democratic process has
prompted political scientists and other scholars to devote much
attention to such questions as: Who participates in elections?"°
Why do some people vote while others do not?6 Are there struc-
tural and systemic explanations for levels of participation?62
Does the system provide a fair opportunity for all citizens to
participate?63 What is the nature of representation in a demo-
" See supra note 22.
60 See MARGARET CONWAY, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED
STATES (1991); ROBERT E. LANE, POLITICAL LIFE: WHY AND How PEOPLE GET
INVOLVED IN POLITICS (1959) (discussing factors that motivate people to vote);
NORMAN H. NIE ET AL., THE CHANGING AMERICAN VOTER (1976) (chronologi-
cally analyzing voter participation in the United States); RAYMOND E.
WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? (1980).
61 See ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER (1964) (explaining
why some classes are more likely to vote than others); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957) (analyzing the effect of the inequali-
ty of voting power); V.0. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS (1949) (discussing factors
that have influenced voting behavior in the southern United States).
62 See CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES (Arend
Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds., 1984) [hereinafter CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL
SYSTEM]; ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES (Bernard
Grofman & Arend Lijphart eds., 1986) [hereinafter ELECTORAL LAWS AND
THEIR CONSEQUENCES]; DOUGLAS RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
ELECTION LAWS (1971) (discussing the effect electoral laws have on voter
participation).
6 3 See ROBERT DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT
IN LAW AND POLICY (1968); Chandler Davidson & George Korbel, At-Large
Elections and Minority Group Representation: A Reexamination of Historical
and Contemporary Evidence, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 37, at
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cratic society?" While many of these studies have focused on
the American political system, voluminous comparative lit-
erature also exists on participation, representation, and voting
behavior in Western democracies.65
This research and its findings have been relevant to litiga-
tion in federal and state courts, especially since the passage of
the Voting Rights Act in 1965. The studies reviewed below,
spanning the period from 1978 to 1994, reveal how scholarship
has evolved from the testing of intuitive, fairly simple hypothe-
ses about the relationship between election structure and
minority representation6 6 to the development of more complex
propositions and methods of analysis.67 The role of social
science has changed over this period from objective descriptive
studies of electoral systems and their effects6 8 to a more activ-
ist role in the litigation process.69 Indeed, by developing opera-
tional standards for identifying violations of the law," by be-
coming expert witnesses on behalf of plaintiffs, " ' and by craft-
64 See HANNA F. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967); Heinz
Eulau & Paul D. Karps, The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components
of Responsiveness, 2 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 233 (1977); Warren E. Miller & D.E.
Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 45 (1963).
65 See GABRIEL A. ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CiviC CuLTURE (1963)
(suggesting a pattern of political attitudes and an underlying set of social
attitudes that is supportive of a stable democratic process); AREND LIJPHART,
DEMOCRACIES (1984); SEYMOUR M. LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES
OF POLITICS (1960) (discussing factors that influence voter participati6n); G.
BINGHAM POWELL, CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES: PARTICIPATION, STABILITY
AND VIOLENCE (1982) (discussing voting behavior in the context of democratic
political performance); SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., PARTICIPATION AND EQUALITY: A
SEVEN NATION COMPARISON (1978) (stressing the importance of analyzing
participatory behavior over participatory attitudes due to the more immediate
impact they have on politics).
' See Susan MacManus, City Council Election Procedures and Minority
Representation: Are They Related?, 59 Soc. SCI. Q. 153 (1978).
0 See Robert L. Engstrom & Michael D. McDonald, The Election of Blacks
to City Councils: Clarifying the Impact of Electoral Arrangements in the
Seats/Population Relationship, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 344 (1981).
' MacManus, Election Procedures, supra note 66, at 154-56.
69 James W. Loewen, Sand in the Bearings: Mistaken Criticisms of
Ecological Regression, 22 URB. LAW. 503 (1990).
7' Bernard Grofman et al., The Totality of Circumstances Test in Section 2
of the 1982 Extension of the Voting Rights Act: A Social Science Perspective,
7 LAw & POLY 199, 201-16 (1985).
71 Loewen, supra note 69, at 503.
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ing remedies that would change electoral practices in many
jurisdictions,72 social scientists became an integral part of the
judicial proceedings.
The findings in the descriptive research show that the
structure of elections does matter, but in what way depends on
several other variables." The early research indicates, in
general, that at-large elections result in the underrepresentation
of blacks.14 Single-member district elections can afford minori-
ty candidates, particularly blacks, a significant advantage over
at-large elections.7 5 But more recent evidence warns us that
this advantage is circumstantial, and its effects are conditioned
by variables such as population size. 6 Furthermore, for some
minority groups such as Hispanics, single-member districts are
less likely to yield proportionate representation under certain
conditions.7
Additionally, research on representation has expanded in
scope to include not only descriptive and passive aspects but
also a behavioral dimension that is focused on the political
efficacy of certain groups. The point made here is that while
2 Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective,
33 UCLA L. REv. 77, 160-80 (1985) (suggesting alternative election systems
and focusing on points which are of particular relevance to U.S. judicial
decision making).
, See MacManus, supra note 66, at 161 (stating that voting "procedures
vary in impact according to the demographic and socioeconomic environments
in which they operate).
74 Robert Engstrom & Michael McDonald, The Effect of At-Large Versus
District Elections on Racial Representation in U.S. Municipalities, in CHOOS-
ING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 62.
5 Id. See also SUSAN WELCH & TIMOTHY BLEDSOE, URBAN REFORM AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES: A STUDY IN REPRESENTATION 50 (1988) (discussing factors
that affect city council elections).
76 See Susan Welch, The Impact ofAt-Large Elections on the Representation
of Blacks and Hispanics, 52 J. POL. 1050 (1990).
77 See Engstrom & McDonald, supra note 74.
78 See ROBERT P. BROWNING ET AL., PROTEST IS NOT ENOUGH: THE STRUG-
GLE OF BLACKS AND HISPANICS FOR EQUALITY IN URBAN POLITICS (1984)
(discussing this issue in the context of blacks and Hispanics in northern
California cities); RACIAL POLIcs IN AMERICAN CITIES (Robert Browning et
al. eds., 1990) (surveying works by several researchers dealing with this issue
in major cities throughout the United States); Timothy Bledsoe, A Research
Note on the Impact of District/At-Large Elections on Black Political Efficacy,
22 URB. AFF. Q. 166 (1986) (analyzing election date and concluding that type
of structure affects political efficacy of black voters); Kenneth J. Meier &
Robert E. England, Black Representation and Educational Policy: Are They
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it is important for minorities to elect representatives who share
their descriptive characteristics, such representatives should be




Notable for both its scope and its approach, one of the early
major studies of council election procedures was completed by
Susan MacManus.7 9 MacManus noted the already emerging
literature proclaiming the negative effect of at-large election
schemes on minority elections.8" Even the most rigorous of
these works, however, focused on either one city or a geographi-
cally restricted group of cities.8 ' MacManus' survey covered
243 cities nationally. In addition to studying different types of
city council election plans, her survey analyzed a variety of
socioeconomic variables. She rejected the standard procedure of
analysis that simply compared at-large schemes to single-mem-
ber districts and instead adopted a seven-part typology for distinguish-
ing between election systems.8 2 She went beyond the accepted
Related? 78 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 392 (1984) (analyzing data which indicate that
black membership on school boards is associated with more equitable educa-
tion policies); Joseph Stewart et al., Black Representation in Urban School
Districts: From School Board to Office to Classroom, 42 WEST. POL. Q. 287
(1988) (concluding that political efficacy of blacks is determined by black
population, district elections, and geographic region).
'9 See MacManus, supra note 66.
o See James H. Kessel, Government Structure and the Political Environ-
ment, 56 AM. POL. SC. REV. 615 (1962); Robert Lineberry & Edmund Fowler,
Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities, 61 AM. POL. SC. REV. 701
(1967); Raymond Wolfinger & John 0. Field, Political Ethos and the Structure
of City Government, 56 AM. POL. Sd. REv. 306 (1962).
" See Leonard A. Cole, Electing Blacks to Municipal Office: Structural
and Social Determinants, 10 URB. AFF. Q. 17 (1974).
82 These are defined as follows:
At-Large, No Residency Restrictions: Candidates run en masse, and those
receiving the highest number of votes are declared elected.
At-Large with Seat (or Position) Restrictions: Candidates can run for a
particular seat, but the seat is not geographically defined, and all candidates
are voted on city-wide.
At-Large With District Residency for All Seats: City is divided into
geographically defined districts and each candidate must live in the district of
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practice of measuring minority representation in councils as a
proportion of minority seats and developed an equity standard
which was operationalized as a differential between the propor-
tion of minorities in the city population and the proportion of
minorities on a city council. 3
MacManus found that such socioeconomic variables as
education, income, ethnicity, age of city, and regional location
are "more highly correlated with equity of minority representa-
tion than is the council member election plan."'  Contrary to
conventional wisdom, she concluded that "[tlhe traditional, and
inaccurate, assertion that at-large election procedures depress
minority representation more than single-member district
election procedures is based on ... erroneous assumptions
..,5 She explained that not all at-large systems are identi-
cal in structure or impact, and that demographic and socioeco-
nomic variables modify the impact of election procedures.
The results of the MacManus survey had significant impli-
cations for future research as well as forthcoming cases before
the courts. First and foremost, this study anticipated the
notion, which later emerged in the courts, that election systems
must be evaluated in the context of the "totality of circumstanc-
es." Second, the study raises a point that courts and civil rights
activists have fully appreciated only more recently: Single-
member districts are not always preferable to at-large election
systems as a mechanism for fair representation.
the seat for which he or she is running but the candidates are voted on city-
wide.
At-Large, Combination of District Residency and Positional Seats: Some
seats are position seats; some are district seats. Candidates for each type of
seat are voted upon citywide.
Partially Mixed Plan: The mayor is elected at-large and is officially a
member of the Council; remaining council members are elected from geograph-
ically defined districts.
Mixed Plan: Some members are elected at-large with no seat or residen-
cy restrictions, and some by single-member ward.
Single-Member District: Candidate runs from geographically defined
district, and is elected only by eligible voters also residing in that district.
' MacManus, supra note 66, at 156.
84Id. at 159.
85 Id. at 161.
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2. Karnig and Welch (1978)
While MacManus was conducting her research on city
councils, Albert Karnig and Susan Welch were examining local
school board elections. Karnig's earlier work indicated that at-
large elections tended to depress black representation on city
councils, and that the problem was more pronounced when
fewer seats were available.86 His collaborative effort with
Susan Welch investigated the effect of electoral institutions and
selection procedures on black school board representation in
forty-three American cities.8 ' They compared elected and
appointed boards and factored in several other variables beyond
method of selection: board size, region, the existence of a black
mayor, council representation and the relative size of the black
population.88
Karnig and Welch specifically targeted big city school
districts. The average population in their sample was 497,000,
each city having a minimum black population of five percent.
Eight-and-a-half million blacks lived in the cities studied,
constituting one-third of the nation's black population and
approximately one-half of the black urban population at that
time." Surprisingly, Karnig and Welch found that blacks were
"proportionately represented-or slightly overrepresented,"9'
having "about 106% of the representation that would be expect-
ed on the basis of their population proportion."9 Therefore,
the aggregate data showed that blacks fared better on school
boards than they did on city councils, where the rate was only
seventy-five percent.93
Contrary to expectations, the research indicated that at-
large systems resulted in slightly higher black representation
" Albert , Karnig, Black Representation on City Councils, 12 URB. AFF.
Q. 223, 223 (1976).
17 Albert K. Karnig & Susan Welch, Representation of Blacks on Big City
School Boards, 59 SOC. SCI. Q. 162 (1978).
8 Id. at 164, 169.
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than did district or mixed systems.94 This was true even
though at-large systems resulted in depressed black representa-
tion on the city councils of the same sample of cities. However,
greater variance was found among at-large school districts than
between at-large and other systems, indicating that the type of
at-large procedure significantly affected representational out-
comes.95 Appointed boards showed black representation rates
slightly lower than at-large elected boards and higher than
district boards.96
Karnig and Welch noted several intervening variables
influencing the overall results. Blacks did considerably better
in the North under at-large election systems (and also some-
what better under appointive, district and combination schemes)
than they did in the South. In cities with a high black popula-
tion (over thirty-five percent) blacks fared best under appointive
systems, with no differences between at-large and other sys-
tems.97 The smaller the black population, the better they fared
proportionately under at-large plans.9" Black representation in
at-large systems was also related to board size. Under such sys-
tems, larger boards (more than seven members) had a 1.34 ratio
of representation to population compared to a 0.75 ratio for
smaller boards (five members) and a 1.27 ratio for seven-mem-
ber boards.99
Although Karnig and Welch did not draw the fine distinc-
tions between types of election systems that MacManus did,
14 Id. at 164-71.
95 Id. at 164-65.
96 Id. at 163.
97 Id. at 166-68.
98 In their study of 140 school board elections in North Carolina, Arringtonl
and Watts found that district election systems afford minorities more electoral
success (than at-large systems) in cases where blacks constitute a substantial
portion of the voting population. See Theodore S. Arrington & Thomas G.
Watts, The Election of Blacks to School Boards in North Carolina, 44 W. POL.
Q. 1099, 1100-05 (1990).
9 In later studies of city councils, Karnig and Welch found that the
proportional representation of blacks increases with council size. See Albert K
Karnig & Susan Welch, BLACK REPRESENTATION AND URBAN POLICY
(1980)[hereinafter Karnig & Welch, URBAN POLICY]; Albert K. Karnig & Susan
Welch, Electoral Structure and Black Representation on City Councils, 63 SOC.
SCI. Q. 99 (1982) [hereinafter Karnig & Welch, Electoral Structure]. For other
studies that document the relationship between council size and minority
representation, see Clinton Jones, The Impact of Local Election Systems on
Black Representation, 11 UB. AFF. Q. 345, 351-52 (1976); Delbert Taebel,
Minority Representation on City Councils, 59 Soc. SCI. Q. 142, 146 (1978).
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their findings are similarly persuasive of the need to analyze
the "totality of circumstances" when assessing election systems.
Perhaps their evidence is even more compelling on the need to
avoid generalizations about the opportunities afforded minori-
ties by at-large elections. Other researchers, however, armed
with larger data bases, would do just that.
3. Robinson and England (1981)
Theodore Robinson and Robert England sought to expand
Karnig and Welch's work on school board elections in the
United States. They increased the sample size from forty-three
to seventy-five cities, but selected for their sample only those
cities in which blacks constituted fifteen percent or more of the
population.0 0 Using a "Black Representation Index" (BRI)
similar to that of Welch and Karnig, they also compared the
ratio of black school board membership to blacks in the general
population.' Their findings were significantly different.
Although they found representation on school boards to be more
equitable than on city councils, they concluded that the manner
of selecting school boards had an unambiguous influence on
representation. Specifically, they discovered that at-large
elections "significantly reduce opportunities for a population-
based equitability in school board representation.""'2 The rep-
resentation ratio for at-large systems was computed at 0.58.
Contrary to the other authors, their research indicated that
representation levels are not influenced by board size.103
Overall, they found appointed boards (1.01 index) to be more
representative than elected boards.0 4
A later study by Kenneth Meier and England confirmed
these results.' 5 Here, again, Meier and England found ap-
pointed systems to be preferable (1.10 index), and they noted
wide variations existing between district plans (0.98 index) and
at-large systems (0.69 index).0 6 Given that the social science
Theodore Robinson & Robert E. England, Black Representation on
Central City School Boards Revisited, 62 SOC. Sci. Q. 495, 496 (1981).
'0' Id. at 496.
10 2 Id. at 501.
113 Id. at 499.
104 Id. at 501.
105 Meier & England, supra note 78, at 400.
I"0 Id. Meier & England sought to extend their work to descriptive
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evidence on at-large systems was somewhat inconsistent, one
could argue that the courts acted reasonably in subsequently
holding that while such procedures were highly suspect, they
would not categorically be found to be illegal.
4. Engstrom and McDonald (1981)
As a result of the work that had appeared in the late 1970s,
a division had begun to emerge in the field of voting analysis as
to whether election systems decisively affected minority repre-
sentation, or whether the results were being driven by other
ecological variables. Robert Engstrom and Michael McDonald
sought to resolve that dispute in a study which examined
electoral arrangements for the city councils in 239 jurisdic-
tions. °7 They divided their population of cities into three
types: at-large, district and mixed. In order to test the ecologi-
cal argument of the "revisionist" scholars, they added five vari-
ables to their regression equation.' 8
Their data came down strongly on the side of the traditional
viewpoint with certain notable qualifications. They found that
"at-large elections, at least in comparison with district-based
electoral systems, tend to 'under-represent' black people.'
0 9
They found the relationship between electoral structure and
black representation to be unaffected by all but one of the
socioeconomic factors, the relative income of the black popula-
tion. Black income appeared to be a more influential determi-
nant than election format in those jurisdictions where the black
population was small (under fifteen percent).
representation. They make a connection between passive descriptive rep-
resentation and active representation that effects policy outcomes in the
interest of those represented. See Stewart, supra note 78, at 297-300. Here
they describe representation as a developmental sequence from school board
membership, to the administrative ranks, through to classroom teaching.
'o, See Robert L. Engstrom & Michael D. McDonald, supra note 74.
o Id. at 350. These variables included population size, rate of population
change from 1960 to 1970, median family income, median school years
completed by those over age 25, and the percentage of the labor force em-
ployed in white-collar occupations.
.09 Id. at 352. The authors noted evidence that in some jurisdictions
districting, with the use of gerrymandering, is a technique for reducing
minority representation. See Robert L. Engstrom & John K. Wildgen, Pruning
Thorns from the Thicket: An Empirical Test of the Existence of Racial Gerry-
mandering, 2 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 465, 465-66 (1977).
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In 1982, Karnig and Welch, whose pioneering work on
school districts in 1978 had helped focus attention on variables
other than electoral systems,1 published a study of repre-
sentation on city councils. 1 ' They found that districted sys-
tems had significantly greater black representation than either
at-large or mixed systems, and they did not identify any notable
variables other than election format." This finding was con-
sistent with Karnig's original work on city councils."' By the
mid-1980s, the weight of the evidence appeared to be mounting
against the revisionist point of view. But the research litera-
ture was far from conclusive in determining the extent to which
electoral systems influence minority representation.
5. Welch (1990)
Welch revisited the issue in 1990. Obviously, she was
familiar with the substantial evidence favoring district systems
over at-large plans. However, she also understood that many of
the major studies might have become dated, since much had
changed during the fifteen years since these empirical studies
began to appear. Black representation in local government had
increased dramatically."4 As a result of the Voting Rights Act
and judicial intervention, the electoral systems of many jurisdic-
tions had begun to change." 5 Using data from 1988, Welch
no Karnig & Welch, URBAN POLICY, supra note 99, at 164-68.
.. Karnig & Welch, Electoral Structure, supra note 99.
12 Karnig & Welch, Electoral Structure, supra note 99, at 99.
11 Karnig & Welch, URBAN POLICY, supra note 99, at 35-36. See also
Timothy Robinson & Thomas Dye, Reformism and Representation on City
Councils, 59 Soc. Sci. Q. 133, 140-41 (1978) (discussing the impact of govern-
ment structure on representation afforded blacks on city councils).
.. Welch, supra note 76, at 1051. The number of black municipal officials
had grown from 623 in 1970, to 1,889 in 1976, to more than 3,200 in 1987. See
JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, NATIONAL ROSTER OF BLACK ELECTED
OFFICIALS, 1987 (1987).
115 Welch, supra note 76, at 65. Svara reported that in the early 1970s, 63%
of city councils elected their members at-large, and 15% had a combined at-
large and district method. See James Svara, Unwrapping Institutional
Packages in Municipal Government, 39 J. POL. 166, 168-69 (1977). Renner
reported that by 1986, while at-large systems were the dominant form in cities
with populations of less than 50,000, only about half the cities with popula-
tions between 50,000 and 99,000, and less than half of those with populations
over 100,000 had at-large systems. See Tari Renner, Municipal Election
Processes: The Impact on Minority Representation,in MUNICIPAL YEARBOOK
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examined every American city with a population of at least
50,000, covering 314 cities in all. Recognizing the more impor-
tant role that Hispanics were beginning to play in American
political life, Welch focused this study on both blacks and
Hispanics. Her overall finding, while somewhat consistent with
her earlier study, managed to capture the changing political
landscape of the nation:
We found evidence of both stability and change in this
representation-electoral structure linkage. Blacks are
still most equitably represented by district elections
(when compared to at-large systems), at least up to the
point that they are majorities or near majorities in
cities. Then it is whites who need district representa-
tion to obtain their proportional share of council
seats."
6
Although the size of a minority population had emerged as
a significant factor in previous studies,"' here it would appear
more profoundly. This study served as a bellwether to future
research revealing that single-member districting schemes do
not accomodate the interests of minorities where the minority
populations are relatively small or not concentrated in a partic-
ular geographical area. Two additional factors qualify the
study's conclusion. First, the data indicated that the ability of
at-large systems to represent blacks had improved substantially
since the 1970s, to the point that the differences among the
systems were no longer statistically significant." 8  Thus,
Welch concluded, "Ir]epresentational levels in the two systems
are converging. "19 Second, the outcome for Hispanics
proved to be equally significant. The study showed that district
elections generally do not function to the advantage of Hispanic
voters. 20 Three factors influence the ability of district elec-
tions to promote Hispanic representation: their level of residen-
tial segregation, their population proportion, and the state or
(1988).
116 Welch, supra note 76, at 1072.
1 1 7 Karnig & Welch, URBAN POLIcY, supra note 99, at 32.
11. Welch, supra note 76, at 1072.
1191d.
120 id.
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region where they live."2 Overall, the study found that small
Hispanic populations enjoyed the best representation under
mixed systems, a finding corroborated by earlier studies of
Hispanic representation.1
2
6. Bullock and MacManus (1990)
Charles Bullock and Susan MacManus focused their collabo-
rative effort entirely on the Hispanic population. Their survey
covered 945 cities with populations over 25,000 and was specifi-
cally designed to examine those structural features referenced
in the 1982 version of the Voting Rights Act: electoral
districting format, staggered terms, majority vote requirements,
council size, and length of term." The most revealing discov-
ery of the project was the general underrepresentation of His-
panics on city councils." No Hispanics served on the city
councils in 835 cities.' Of the 110 cities with Hispanic coun-
cil members, seventy-nine (seventy-two percent) had only one
member.126  In only nine cities did Hispanics constitute at
least half of the council." The single best predictor of repre-
sentation was the size of the Hispanic population." Hispanic
council representation was shown to increase with the percent
of the Hispanic population, 9 but since most city populations
are overwhelmingly non-Hispanic, 30 representation levels
across the nation are weak. Most cities with Hispanic members
are concentrated in five states: Arizona, California, Colorado,
New Mexico and Texas.''
121 Id.
'r See MacManus, supra note 66, at 156-58; Taebel, supra note 99, at 145-
52.
' Charles S. Bullock & Susan A. MacManus, Structural Features of
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131 Id. at 670.
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There was no discernable evidence that electoral format had
a significant impact on voting outcomes. 3 2 To state it differ-
ently, there is no reason to believe here that Hispanics, who
constitute a relatively small population minority in most juris-
dictions and are not residentially segregated to the degree that
blacks are, will improve their lot in any substantial way by
adopting district voting systems.
7. Alozie (1992)
Like Hispanics, Asians constitute a relatively small popula-
tion group, and they are not geographically concentrated to the
degree that blacks are.'33 Their educational achievement lev-
el, however, usually exceeds that of other racial minorities, and
on the average, Asians enjoy higher incomes than whites.'34
Nicholas Alozie surveyed every American city - sixty-six in
all - with a population of 25,000 or more and an Asian popula-
tion of at least five percent.'35
The most telling revelation from the data pointed to the
general underrepresentation of Asians in local legislatures.
While the mean percentage of Asians in the population of these
cities was ten percent, they held 4.1% of the council seats.'36
In only one jurisdiction did they hold more than one seat, and in
that case, Asians held two seats.'37 The study concluded that
"the district and mixed election systems do not differ markedly
from at-large plans in the opportunities they grant Asians for
election to city councils."'38 The most crucial element in deter-
132 Some early studies did find that at-large election methods depress
Hispanic representation. See Chandler Davidson & George Korbel, At-Large
Elections and Minority-Group Representation: A Re-Examination of Historical
and Contemporary Evidence, 43 J. POL. 982, 985-92 (1981); Taebel, supra note
99, at 145-51. However, later studies, utilizing more elaborate analytic
approaches and more recent data, indicated that electoral systems do not have
a significant impact on Hispanic representation. Of particular importance to
Hispanics is population size and residential patterns. See Jeffrey S. Zax,
Election Methods and Black and Hispanic City Council Membership, 71 SOc.
Sci. Q. 338, 346-53 (1990).
13 Nicholas 0. Alozie, The Election of Asians to City Councils, 73 Soc. Sci.
Q. 90, 91, 93, 97-98 (1992).
134 Id. at 94.
135 Id. at 92.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 94.
138 Id. at 96.
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mining Asian representation was the proportion of the Asian
population in a jurisdiction. Some evidence linked Asian pres-
ence in a local legislature to level of income.
8. Davidson and Grofman (1994)
Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman, two of the
nation's leading scholars on the Voting Rights Act, are prolific
contributors to the social science literature and are recognized
expert witnesses in cases brought before the courts on behalf of
aggrieved minorities. Their most recent collaborative project is
a collection of readings designed to assess the effect of the
Voting Rights Act on the South.'39 Specifically, they sought to
determine what effect a change in election systems, from at-
large to single-member or mixed systems, has had on black
representation in the eight Southern states covered by Sec-
tion 5.140 Previous research had documented evidence of sub-
stantial black progress in the South as a result of the Voting
Rights Act.' In addition to updating research, this project
introduced more sophisticated techniques, utilizing longitudinal
analysis and a control group of cities that did not undergo
changes in their election systems.
1 9 QuIET REVOLUTION IN THE SoUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT, 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) [hereinaf-
ter QUIET REVOLUTION].
140 The survey covered the seven states that the Act continuously has
covered: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Virginia as well as Texas, which came in under the Act's provi-
sions of 1975.
141 Davidson & Korbel, supra note 132; Peggy Heilig & Robert J. Mundt,
Changes in Representational Equity: The Effect of Adopting Districts, 64 SOC.
ScI. Q. 393 (1983).
142 Davidson and Grofman describe the data set as follows:
The data were collected for two points separated on average by
about fifteen years. The earlier time was 1974 in a plurality of the
states, but for Alabama it was 1970; for North Carolina, 1973; for
Virginia, 1977; and for Georgia, 1980. The latter time was 1989 for
all states except Georgia, for which it was 1990.... In all but two
states, only cities with a black population of 10 percent or more
were examined. Exceptions are Texas, where a combined black and
Hispanic population of 10 percent is the threshold...and North
Carolina, where a combined black and American Indian population
threshold of 10 percent is used.... The population threshold is 1,000
in Mississippi; 2,500 in Louisiana; 6,000 in Alabama; and 10,000 in
Georgia, Texas and South Carolina. In North Carolina all incorpo-
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In a summary chapter on municipal election outcomes,
Grofman and Davidson reported continued progress in achieving
fair representation. Using an equity score that relates popula-
tion ratios to representation on city councils, they found:
1. Majority-white cities with single-member districts
gave blacks almost proportional representation. Cities
that were ten to twenty-nine percent black had a mean
equity score of 1.14, those that were thirty to forty-nine
percent black, a score of .92.'
2. Majority-white cities with at-large systems had a
much lower black equity score of 0.56.'4
3. In majority-black jurisdictions with districted sys-
tems, black equity was nearly proportionate at
0.92. 145
4. In the four states for which data was available that
had at-large elections for majority-black populations,
the scores were mixed: in Alabama, it was 1.09; in
Louisiana, 0.80; in Mississippi, 0.70; and in North
Carolina 0.14.'
While this presentation supports the argument that single-
member districts promote minority equity, a closer examination
using longitudinal data better explains the conditions under
which blacks can most benefit from such plans. Here, again,
population size figures in as a key variable. Grofman and
Davidson conclude:
On average, the greatest effect of a change from an at-
large plan to single member districts occurred in major-
ity-black cities (53 percentage points); the next greatest
effect occurred in cities that were 30-49.9% black (34
points); and the lowest but still substantial effect oc-
rated cities are examined, including cities with a population fewer
than 500. The Virginia chapter reports on all cities that are 'inde-
pendent.'
Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson, The Effect of Municipal Election
Structure on Black Representation in Eight Southern States, in QUIET REVOLU-
TION, supra note 139, at 303.
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curred in cities that were 10-29.9% black (23 points).
In terms of the net difference measure, the equivalent
net gains were 33, 19, and 16 percentage points respec-
tively.
147
The lesson to be drawn here is that single-member districting
schemes are most likely to have a positive effect on minority
representation in jurisdictions where the racial minority is a
numerical majority. This point comes through even more
powerfully in a companion chapter on legislative representation
by Hadley and Grofman."'
Here again, substantial progress is noted. Between 1965
and 1985, the number of black state legislators in the eleven
states of the old confederacy increased from three to 176.149
By most standards of equity, this dramatic improvement failed
to satisfy those concerned with black representation. The
increase represented only ten percent of the legislative seats,
although blacks comprised twenty percent of the population. 50
The data is nevertheless informative. Hadley and Grofman
concluded that the increase in black legislators resulted directly
from an increase in the number of black-majority districts.
They further explained that, given the low turnout rates of
blacks, these population majorities must be decisive in order to
reap the benefits of districting strategies: "[Elven today black
populations well above 50 percent appear necessary if blacks are
to have a realistic opportunity to elect representatives of their
choice in the South."'51
In understanding the conditions under which districting
plans are likely to benefit blacks, one also must understand the
limits of this strategy. If blacks comprise only twenty percent
147 Id. at 308. Changes in electoral systems were not the only actions that
were taken in these jurisdictions as a result of the Voting Rights Act. Key to
the Justice Department strategy was the removal of barriers to the franchise
such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and white primaries. See James E. Alt, The
Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black and White Voter Registration in the
South, in QuIET REVOLUTION, supra note 139, at 351.
148 Lisa Hadley & Bernard Grofinan, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act
on Minority Representation: Black Officeholding in Southern State Legisla-
tures and Congressional Delegations, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 139,
at 335.
' 49 Id. at 336.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 335.
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of the entire population, then a mathematical limitation exists
as to just how many such districts with extraordinary majorities
can be created. This limit, by definition, appears
disproportionately low for the size of the population. Moreover,
most Southern blacks do not live in majority-black districts.'52
Since not a single black legislator was elected by a majority-
white district in the South,'53 this approach leaves the ma-
jority of Southern blacks without effective representation - at
least as representation is defined in terms of race, which is the
premise of such schemes.
9. Summary
The substantial body of research that has evolved over the
last fifteen years indicates generally that at-large voting sys-
tems do not afford minorities, especially blacks, the same
opportunities as district plans. But the evidence is somewhat
circumstantial, modified by environmental factors and changes
over time as voting systems have been altered to comply with
the law. Indeed, not all blacks benefit from such schemes.
Only a distinct minority, clustered into voting districts with
supermajority population margins, benefits. Single-member
districting systems apparently do not benefit other minorities
even to the extent that they benefit blacks. Hispanics, Asians
and those groups who comprise a small proportion of the popu-
lation are not as likely to improve their representation as a
result of districting schemes. In fact, those groups with small
proportionate numbers in the population quite often fare better
under mixed or modified at-large systems.
C. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE COURTS
1. Operationalizing Standards
The 1986 Supreme Court decision in Thornburg v.
Gingles"' went further than any judicial ruling in history to
define standards for determining discrimination in voting.
152 In five Southern states, more than 80% of blacks lived outside of
majority-black senate districts; in three states, more than 70% of blacks lived
outside of majority-black house districts; and in two states, 50% percent of
blacks lived outside of majority-black house districts. Id. at 338.
153 id.
154 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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Gingles adopted in full the factors outlined in the Senate Com-
mittee Report that had accompanied the 1982 Amendments to
the Voting Rights Act.'55 The Court put forward a three-part
set of criteria that could be used to review claims of vote dilu-
tion.'56 Among the concepts applied to assess the constitu-
tionality of at-large election systems, particular attention was
given to the element of "racial polarization." Although the
Senate Report emphasized that no one factor for consideration
is dispositive under the "totality of circumstances" principle,
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, went to great lengths
to explain that "racial polarization" is a prerequisite to a finding
of discrimination:
While many or all of the factors listed in the Senate
Report may be relevant to a claim of vote dilution
through submergence in multi-member districts,... a
bloc voting majority must usually be able to defeat
candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geo-
graphically insular.., group .... These circumstanc-
es are necessary preconditions for multimember dis-
tricts to operate to impair minority voters' ability to
elect representatives of their choice.'57
Subsequent lower court decisions also have treated racial
polarization as a "keystone" to voting rights claims.' 8
155 SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITEE REPORT, supra note 39, at 2. In fact the
Report of the Subcommittee on the Constitution to the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary listed 20 factors that the courts had considered in prior cases.
These factors are: some history of discrimination; at-large voting systems or
multi-member districts; some history of "dual" school systems; cancellation of
registration for failure to vote; residency requirements for voters; special
requirements for independent or third-party candidates; off-year elections;
substantial candidate cost requirements; staggered terms of office; high
economic costs associated with registration; disparity in voter registration by
race; history of lack of proportional representation; disparity in literacy rates
by race; evidence of racial block voting; history of English-only ballots; history
of poll taxes; disparity in distribution of services by race; numbered electoral
posts; prohibitions on single-shot voting; majority vote requirements. See Paul
W. Jacobs & Timothy G. O'Rourke, Racial Polarization in Vote Dilution Cases
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: The Impact of Thornburg v. Gingles,
3 J.L. & POL. 295, 308 (1988).
6 478 U.S. 30 at 50-51.
'57 Id. at 48-49.
... See, e.g., Lee County Branch NAACP v. City of Opelika, 748 F.2d 1473,
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By the time the Court handed down the Gingles opinion, a
substantial body of social science research already existed,
prompting the courts to view at-large systems as suspect. As
evidence of racial polarization became pivotal in vote-dilution
cases and the Court accepted statistical correlation as a method
of proof, social scientists gained new stature in the litigation
process. Few major cases would proceed without the presenta-
tion of sophisticated social science evidence by attorneys on one
or both sides. Many of the factors specified in the Senate
'Report - for example, a history of discrimination, special
election provisions, slating, social disadvantage, racial cam-
paigns, and minority success - were readily susceptible to
direct observation.'59 But the issue of racial polarization is
more subtle and complex, and its prominence in forthcoming
cases would open the door to heated methodological debates
among attorneys and social scientists. These professional
disagreements remain unresolved.
2. Early Cases
Many decisions in the late 1960s and early 1970s alluded to
the phenomenon of "block voting."'60 However it was not until
1972, in City of Petersburg v. United States,161 that the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia applied the concepts
of "block voting" and "polarization" as part of a formal analysis
of evidentiary data. In Petersburg, the city pursued an annex-
ation plan that would have increased its white population by
fifty percent, thereby removing the majority status of the black
population. A question arose as to whether an at-large election
1481 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Dallas County Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1529,
1535 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d
1546, 1566 (11th Cir. 1984); Latino Political Action Comm. v. City of Boston,
609 F. Supp. 739, 743 (D. Mass. 1985). See also Jacobs & O'Rourke, supra note
155, at 301, 310 n. 69 (characterizing racial polarization as the linchpin to a
claim of vote dilution).
9 See Bernard Grofman, Expert Witness Testimony and the Evolution of
Voting Rights Case Law, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note
19, at 197, 202-06; Grofman et al., Totality of Circumstances, supra note 70, at
209.
160 See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966); Dolson v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 330 F. Supp. 1290, 1297 (D. Md. 1971); Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305
F. Supp. 1364, 1367 (S.D. Ind. 1969). See also Jacobs & O'Rourke, supra note
155, at 303.
161 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1025-26 (D.D.C. 1972), affd, 410 U.S. 962 (1973). See
Jacobs & O'Rourke, supra note 155, at 303-04.
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plan for the city council would result in the dilution of black
votes.
The methodological approach used to determine polarization
was "homogeneous precinct analysis." This analysis focused on
the voting returns of four precincts over the course of four
elections. The population of two precincts was nearly all black;
the population in the others was nearly all white. The data
indicated that in every election studied, white-precinct support
for white candidates never fell below ninety-one percent, where-
as black precinct support for black candidates never fell below
eighty-one percent. The court accepted this evidence as proof of
racial block voting.
Homogeneous precinct analysis would become a widely
accepted approach for determining racial polarization.'62 This
approach commonly applies a ninety-percent threshold for
identifying precincts or districts by race. For example, only
those precincts that contain a black population of ninety percent
or more would be considered black precincts. The great advan-
tage of the homogeneous precinct analysis as an analytic tech-
nique is its straightforward simplicity, which allows the ap-
proach to be easily understood by those unfamiliar with statisti-
cal methods.
Homogeneous precinct analysis, however, also contains
significant flaws. The approach relies on the existence of
homogeneous districts, but when the particular protected group
in question is either small or not geographically concentrat-
ed - as is often the case with Hispanics or Asians and other
minorities - then such precincts do not exist. Even when they
do exist, homogeneous precinct analysis makes generalizations
about the entire voting population on the basis of a rather
limited sample. Specifically, the approach assumes that those
who live in racially isolated areas behave similarly to those from
more integrated places. This assumption may not be true
either. As Engstrom and McDonald have pointed out:
Hypothetically, black people residing in racially inte-
grated neighborhoods may tend to be better educated
and more gainfully employed than those residing in
racially segregated neighborhoods; those socioeconomic
... For a general discussion of the evolution of homogenous-precinct
analysis, see JAMES W. LOEWEN, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1982).
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differences might result in differences in political be-
havior.'63
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, no one methodological
technique prevailed for determining racial polarization in
voting. Even the White'" and Zimmer 6 decisions that had
so explicitly identified factors for reviewing vote-dilution claims
did not provide any clear direction. In fact, neither case even
mentioned polarization or block voting among its respective
laundry list of items for consideration. Reviewing the cases in
the decade preceding Gingles, Jacobs and O'Rourke cite four
mathematical tests that various federal courts have used as a thresh-
old of polarization:'66
1. Opposing Percentage Test. Voting is declared polarized
when some specific majority of one race votes in opposition to a
specific majority of another race. This standard can range from
a simple majority167 to ninety percent.
168
2. Single Index Test. Voting percentages for different
groups are combined into a single index. If the combined
percentage of voters voting for candidates of their own race
exceeds 160 (out of a possible 200), then polarization is found.
Courts have accepted several variations of this test.'69
3. Correlation Test. A statistical correlation is computed to
determine if a relationship exists between the racial composition
of precincts and voting patterns.
70
4. Separate Electorates Test. This test simply asks wheth-
er the outcome of an election would have been different if the
163 Engstrom & McDonald, supra note 7, at 373.
16 White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
1" Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973).
166 Jacobs & O'Rourke, supra note 155, at 336-37.
167 See Butts v. City of New York, 614 F. Supp. 1546 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(accepting simple-majority standard); but see Collins v. City of Norfolk, 679
F. Supp. 557, 566-68 (E.D. Va. 1988) (rejecting simple-majority standard).
" See Mosley v. Sadler, 469 F. Supp. 563, 568 (E.D. Tex. 1979).
169 See United States v. Dallas County Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1529, 1535 (11th
Cir. 1984); Political Civil Voters Org. v. City of Terrell, 565 F. Supp. 338, 348
(N.D. Tex. 1983); City of Port Arthur v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 987, 1007
(D.C.C. 1981).
170 See NAACP v. Gadsden County Sch. Bd., 691 F.2d 878, 883 (11th Cir.
1982); McMillan v. Escambia County, 688 F. 2d 960,966 (5th Cir. 1982); Major
v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 337 (E.D. La. 1983).
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election were held separately among different groups. The trial
court in Gingles used this test."7 '
3. After Gingles
In Thornburg v. Gingles,7 2 the Supreme Court accepted
the application of two techniques for making inferences about
voting behavior from aggregate data: homogeneous precinct
analysis and bivariate ecological regression. With its facility for
application and explanation, homogeneous precinct analysis
remains an acceptable approach for review of elections suspect-
ed of racial polarization. Due to the limitations noted above,
however, homogeneous precinct analysis is rarely utilized
exclusively to demonstrate vote dilution. 73 More significant
weight is given to ecological regression. The major advantage of
this technique is its use of data on voting behavior from all
districts in a jurisdiction, not just those that are racially homo-
geneous. In fact, ecological regression can be adopted even in
those situations where no homogeneous districts exist.
Ecological regression is a technique for measuring the
relationship between two variables, in this case racial composi-
tion and voting preference. It usually involves two tests: corre-
lation analysis and regression analysis. A correlation coefficient
measures the consistency between a racially defined voting age
population (VAP) and votes for a particular candidate. A score
"r" can range from +1.0 (perfect positive relationship) to -1.0
(perfect negative relationship). A positive score would predict
that the number of votes cast for a candidate of a given race
increases as the proportion of the VAP of the same race increas-
es. Data from such an analysis can be presented on a
scattergram. While an "r" score indicates the existence of a
relationship between two variables, a regression coefficient ("b"
score) measures the strength of the relationship. From the
latter one can predict the degree to which votes for a particular
'~' Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
172 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
'See Loewen & Grofman, supra note 7 (using homogeneous precinct
analysis, ecological regression and correlation to more accurately analyze
voting patterns); Grofman et al., Totality of Circumstances, supra note 70, at
209 (arguing that ecological regression and homogeneous precinct analysis
should be used simultaneously, so that they offset each other's weaknesses).
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candidate change as a result of specific changes in the racial
composition of the VAP.
Despite its wide-ranging acceptance by the courts, ecological
regression has its critics among reputable social scientists.
Some argue that limiting an analysis of elections to only two
variables - race and choice - does not sufficiently explain
differences in the political behavior of blacks and whites.
Instead the choices may be determined by other factors not
accounted for such as income, education, the policy positions of
candidates, and expenditures by candidates. These experts
apply multivariate methods of analysis to assess a causal
relationship between voting behavior and a number of other
variables, only one of which would be race."'4 In fact, one ex-
pert witness, Charles Bullock, presented a multivariate regres-
sion analysis of city commission races in Fort Lauderdale,
Florida, to successfully defeat a claim of vote dilution both at
the district and appellate court levels.'75 Notwithstanding
such criticism, bivariate ecological regression remains the
standard approach used in voting rights cases. 7 6 Its propo-
nents argue that under the standards adopted by the Supreme
Court in Gingles, it is unneccessary to explain the cause of
racially polarized voting as long as one can demonstrate that
such polarization exists.'
174 See John K Wildgen, Vote Dilution Litigation and Cold Fusion Technol-
ogy, 22 URB. LAW. 487, 487-94 (1990) (attacking ecological regression because
of the "impossible" results it often generates). See also W.S. Robinson, Ecologi-
cal Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals, 15 AM. Soc. REV. 351 (1950).
Richard L. Engstrom and Michael D. McDonald have recommended the use of
multivariate analysis to measure the extent to which different minority groups
within a population vote the same. See Richard L. Engstrom & Michael D.
McDonald, Quantitative Evidence in Vote Dilution Litigation, Part II: Minori-
ty Coalitions and Multivariate Analysis, 19 URB. LAW. 65 (1987).
175 McCord v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 787 F.2d 1528, 1532 (11th Cir.
1986). See Charles Bullock, Racial Crossover Voting and the Election of Black
Officials, 46 J. POL. 238 (1984).
176 For a defense of this approach, see Bernard Grofman, Multivariate
Methods and the Analysis of Racially Polarized Voting: Pitfalls in the Use of
Social Science in the Courts, 72 Soc. Sci. Q. 826 (1991) [hereinafter Pitfalls in
the Use of Social Science]; Loewen, supra note 69, at 503, 504-05, 512-13
(offerng a defense of ecological regression).
177 Pitfalls in the Use of Social Science, supra note 176, at 828.
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4. Creating Safe Districts
Nearly two decades of social science research and a prepon-
derance of judicial rulings reveal that at-large and multi-mem-
ber voting districts often block the fair representation of minori-
ties, especially blacks. The major thrust of the court-imposed
remedies was the creation of single-member districts that did
not dilute the voting strength of protected groups. As early as
1977, the Supreme Court declared its intent to go beyond the
standard of racial neutrality in order to review the overall racial
consequences of voting plans.17 Before the 1982 Amendments
to the Voting Rights Act, the Court ruled that in order to pass
judicial scrutiny, a single-member district plan must "overcome
the effects of past discrimination and racial bloc voting."'79
Later judicial decisions put forward several principles that
would guide the architects of districting remedies, including
population equality, compactness, and contiguity.8 ' Natural
boundaries and communities of interest supposedly were recog-
nized, and under certain circumstances some protection of
incumbents was permitted.'18  Except for county boundaries,
political geography was not usually accepted as a consideration
prior to Bandemer."'8 Some principles could be applied rather
straightforwardly; others would require more rigorous analysis.
For example, based on the one-person, one-vote standard,
measuring and comparing the size of election districts becomes
a fairly easy way to assure that votes are of equal value.'83
78 United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 164 n.22 (1977).
179 Allain v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002, 1004 (1984) (quoting the App. to Motion
to Dismiss or Affirm in No. 83-1772, p.14a).
1. Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1410-16 (7th Cir. 1984); Terrazas V.
Clements, 581 F. Supp. 1329, 1358-59 (N.D. Tex. 1984); Major v. Treen, 574
F. Supp. 325, 352-54 (E.D. La. 1983). A three-judge panel in Arkansas later
adopted the Gingles standards for reviewing a single-member districting
scheme. See Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 202-11 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
... See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 138-141 (1986); Gonzalez V.
Monterey County, 808 F. Supp. 727, 735-36 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Burton v.
Sheheen, 793 F.Supp. 1329, 1343-44 (D.S.C. 1992).
182 478 U.S. at 130-31; see James U. Blacksher, Drawing Single-Member
Districts to Comply With the Voting Rights Amendments of1982,17 URB. LAW.
347 (1985); QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY, supra note 7, at 110-22.
" Mahan v. Howell, 330 F.Supp. 1138, 1140 (E.D. Va. 1971), affd, 410
U.S. 315 (1973), established that state legislative districts may vary in size by
up to 15% if legitimate reasons were offered. Mahan set the standard for local
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Natural boundaries are visible to the naked eye. The qualities
of compactness and contiguity, however, are matters of judg-
ment, and more difficult to ascertain."M  In America's
pluralistic system of government "communities of interest" are
not always stable. Groups that align on one issue may find
themselves on opposite sides regarding another. In the end,
race becomes the proxy for defining group interest, an easy
formula but simplistic and presumptive at best. How might one
determine whether a districting plan would "overcome the
effects of past discrimination"?' Social scientists became
intricately involved in defining remedies for past practices.
Single-member districts were identified as the solution of choice.
And the task was a rather ambitious one: Draw boundaries
that would guarantee minority success at the polls. Based on
the study of past elections, analysts would define mathematical
thresholds revealing how many members of a protected group
must live in a district in order to assure certain outcomes. 186
An issue that remained was how large a popular majority a
protected group needed in order to win a contest. A simple
majority would not necessarily work. Other demographic and
government jurisdictions in Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971). Later,
in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1983), the Court set a standard
of strict equality for congressional districts. See generally Samuel Issacharoff,
Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness,
71 TEx. L. REV. 1643 (1993) (arguing that even though the opportunity exists
for those who control the redistricting process to employ partisan gerryman-
dering for their benefit, the standards enunciated in Bandemer were fimda-
mentally unworkable due to their ambiguity, and thus would do little to
advance the one-person, one-vote standard); see also Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrali-
ty, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Interactions Between Law and
Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968).
184 See Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Com-
pactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE
L. & POLY REV. 301 (1991); Richard G. Niemi et al., Measuring Compactness
and the Role of a Compactness Standard in a Test for Partisan and Racial
Gerrymandering, 52 J. POL. 1155 (1990); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G.
Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts" and Voting Rights: Evaluating
Election District Appearances after Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 553,
586 (1993).
t 8 5Allain v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002, 1004 (1984).
188 A "threshold of representation" is a measure of a district in a jurisdic-
tion with the smallest minority proportion that has elected a black representa-
tive. A "threshold of exclusion" is a measure of a district with the largest
minority proportion that has never elected a black representative. See Bernard
Grofinan, Alternatives to Single-Member Plurality Districts: Legal and
Empirical Issues, 9 POL'Y STUD. J. 875, 881 (1980-81).
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behavioral characteristics of the population had to be consid-
ered: What proportion of the voting age population were citi-
zens? Of these, how many were registered to vote? What
proportion actually would choose to exercise their franchise?
One popular rule of thumb to emerge in the literature was the
sixty-five percent rule. Expert witnesses have persuaded the
courts that in order to assure a minority victory at the polls at
least sixty-five percent of the population in a district must
consist of the protected group1
8 7
In recent years, computer technology has been introduced
into the districting process, allowing practitioners to redraw
boundaries while taking into account all the demographic and
geographic variables needed to achieve the desired results.'88
By the time of the 1990 census, the Topologically Integrated
Geographic Encoding and Referencing (TIGER) system had been
developed in conjunction with the U.S. Geological Survey to
produce a digital street map of the entire country.8 9 Software
packages enable a user to redraw district boundaries on a
personal computer. One cannot help but to be struck by the
technical power that exists to alter the structure of electoral
systems and to manipulate election results. This new capability
has allowed the courts and the experts who testify before them
to assume an unparalleled role in the political process.
5. Summary
Throughout the evolution of voting rights legislation and its
enforcement by the courts, the role of social scientists has
changed from one of objective evaluation to active participation.
187 See Mississippi v. United States, 451 U.S. 934 (1981); United Jewish
Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. at 164; Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds
County, 554 F.2d. 139, 150 (5th Cir. 1977). For a critical assessment of the
65% rule, see Kimball Brace et al., Minority Voting Equality: The 65 Percent
Rule in Theory and Practice, 10 LAW & PoLY 43, 44-47 (1988).
11 See Arthur J. Anderson & William S. Dahlstrom, Technological Gerry-
mandering: How Computers Can Be Used in the Districting Process to Comply
With Judicial Criteria, 22 URB. LAW. 59, 74 (1990); Pildes & Niemi, supra note
184, at 553.
189 Anderson & Dahlstrom, supra note 188, at 73. For an analysis on how
computer technology was utilized to facilitate the districting process for the
City Council in New York City, see Frank J. Macchiarola & Joseph G. Diaz,
The 1990 New York City Districting Commission: Renewed Opportunity for
Participation in Local Government or Race-Based Gerrymandering, 14
CAIDozo L. REv. 1221-24 (1993).
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Social scientists have contributed much to our understanding of
how the structure of election systems affects representation.
They have been influential in enhancing the courts' ability to
identify such complex phenomena as vote dilution and racial
polarization. Most significantly, expert witnesses have become
involved in crafting judicial remedies that will determine both
the structure and the outcome of election systems.
Some of the social scientists' remedial action has been
inconsistent with their own objective findings. For example,
although a causal relationship between voting behavior and race
cannot always be established, most remedies have revolved
around racial criteria. The corrective actions that the courts
accepted moved in the direction of erecting single-member
districts. However, both the national research data and the
remedies chosen indicate that single-member districting
schemes are most likely to succeed when protected groups
constitute a strong majority of the population. Therefore, these
remedies may fail to serve the interests of protected groups
whose numbers are small. Perhaps most important of all, one
might question the underlying strategy of this more activist
intervention. Does districting on the basis of race contribute to
racial polarization? In cases where protected groups do not
constitute a viable voting minority, have the architects of
districting plans resorted to a new form of racial gerrymander-
ing? What is the legitimate role of the courts and expert inter-
venors in manipulating the outcome of the electoral process?
D. SHAW V. RENO
1. The Claim
As a result of population growth evidenced in the 1990
census, North Carolina became entitled to an additional seat in
the U.S. House of Representatives. Consequently, in 1991 the
North Carolina General Assembly enacted a reapportionment
plan that expanded the number of its congressional districts
from eleven to twelve. This plan included one "safe district" for
blacks in the northeastern corner of the state. When the plan
was submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice pursuant to
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the Attorney General reject-
ed the plan on the grounds that it minimized minority voting
strength by failing to carve out a second minority district in the
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southern part of the state, where black residents were concen-
trated.190
In response to the Attorney General's objection, the North
Carolina legislature prepared a revised plan that included a
second minority district along a 160-mile narrow strip of territo-
ry in the north-central part of the state. The unusually shaped
district has been described by various critics as "ugly," ". gro-
tesque," "tortured," "labyrinthine," "an offense to the sensibili-
ties," a "monstrosity," "political pornography," "an angry snake,"
"a Rorschach ink-blot test," a "ketchup splash," and a "bug
splat." 191 Although this second district was not located in the
southern sector of the state, as originally suggested by the
Attorney General, the Justice Department gave its approval.
Subsequently, five white voters sued state and federal officials,
seeking a permanent injunction against the plan. The plaintiffs
alleged that the arbitrary creation of two districts along racial
lines with the explicit purpose of assuring the election of two
minority candidates constituted racial gerrymandering in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' Furthermore, the plaintiffs claimed that the
revised plan denied their right to participate in a colorblind
political process, and they argued that the plan did not abide by
ordinary considerations for districting, such as compactness,
contiguity, geographical boundaries, or political subdivisions.
After the District Court dismissed the claim, 93 the U.S. Su-
preme Court granted certiorari. In a five-person majority opin-
ion, a highly fractious Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
decision and remanded the case.'94
190 An Assistant Attorney General found that "the proposed configuration
of the district boundary lines in the south-central to southeastern part of the
state appear to minimize minority voting strength given the significant
minority population in this area of the state." Shaw v. Barr, 808 F.Supp. 461,
463 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
"I As cited in Ripley Eagles Rand, Note, The Fancied Line: Shaw v. Reno
and the Chimerical Gerrymander, 72 N.C. L. REV. 725 (1994). Even some
notable voting rights experts who historically had been strong supporters of
the "safe district" concept were critical of this contorted plan. See Bernard
Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right if He Had Said: "When It
Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, Its the Only Thing"?, 14
CARDOZO L. REv. 1237, 1261 (1993).
192 Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. at 467.
193 Id. at 466-77.
194 Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). The majority included Chief
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2. The Decision
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor particularly
noted the peculiar shape of the challenged district, 95 main-
taining that it "resembles the most egregious racial gerryman-
ders of the past."'96 Justice O'Connor went to great lengths to
acknowledge that no absolute constitutional standard exists for
compactness or contiguity.197 The Court explained futher that
race-conscious decision-making is permissible under some
circumstances. 98  In what many analysts consider the most
significant aspect of Shaw, the Court stated that such irregular
districting, apparently designed to politically segregate the
races, must be subjected to strict scrutiny to assure the exis-
tence of a sufficiently compelling state interest.' 99
Finally, the Court clearly articulated that when it comes to
districting, appearances are important:
[W]e believe that apportionment is one area in which
appearances do matter. A reapportionment plan that
includes in one district individuals who belong to the
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas.
'9' Justice O'Connor wrote:
It is approximately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no
wider than the 1-85 corridor. It winds in snake-like fashion through
tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas 'until it
gobbles in enough enclaves of black neighborhoods.' Shaw v. Barr,
at 476-477 (Voorhees, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Northbound and Southbound drivers on 1-85 sometimes find
themselves in separate districts in one county, only to 'trade'
districts when they enter the next county. Of the 10 counties
through which District 12 passes, five are cut into three different
districts; even towns are divided. At one point the district remains
contiguous only because it intersects at a single point with two
other districts before crossing over them.
113 S. Ct. at 2820-21.
19 Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
197 Id. at 2826-27. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 184, at 494-95.
198 "This court has never held that race-conscious decision-making is
impermissible in all circumstances ... " Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824. "[Rledistri-
cting differs from other kinds of state decision making in that the legislature
always is aware of race when it draws district lines.... That sort of race
consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible racial discrimination."
Id. at 2826.
19 "Express racial classifications are immediately suspect.... They
threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial
group and to incite racial hostility." Id. at 2824.
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same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by
geographical and political boundaries, and who have lit-
tle in common with one another, but the color of their
skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political
apartheid. It reinforces the perception that members of
the same racial group - regardless of age, education,
economic status, or the community in which they
live - think alike, share the same political interests,
and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We
have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermis-
sible racial stereotypes. 00
Beyond the issues of racial classification and segregation,
the Court explained how racial gerrymandering influences
political decision-making and the quality of representation:
The message that such districting sends to elected
representatives is equally pernicious. When a district
obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived
common interests of one racial group, elected officials
are more likely to believe that their primary obligation
is to represent only the members of that group, rather
than their constituency as a whole. This is altogether




Well-deserved disagreement exists on what lasting effect
Shaw will have on future apportionment plans. On the one
hand, one might argue that subjecting apportionment plans to
strict judicial scrutiny amounts to a complete reversal of the
race-conscious districting that the Court accepted in previous
decisions. The Court did not admit to such a reversal, even
though it had previously permitted plans designed to overcome
historical patterns of discrimination.02 Moreover, the Court
2
0 Id. at 2827. See David D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry
Into the Problem of Racial Gerrymandering Under the Voting Rights Act, 92
MICH. L. REv. 652 (1993); Pildes & Niemi, supra note 184, at 492-541.
201 Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
202 See Jonathan M. Sperling, Note, Equal Protection and Race-Conscious
Reapportionment: Shaw v Reno, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 283 (1994). Rand
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also hinted at the need to refocus attention upon the "compact-
ness" requirement in an earlier decision." 3 On the other
hand, the case may merely be an exceptional response to an ex-
traordinary set of circumstances, including the ugly district
itself. Therefore, Shaw may not set any sweeping new prece-
dent for the Court.0 4
Unfortunately, the present decision does not provide us with
any substantial guidance as to what the Constitution per-
mits. °5 Nonetheless, we do know that judicial tolerance for
gerrymandering, no matter what its justification, is limited.
The extent of that limit, however, is uncertain. In such a cli-
mate of legal uncertainty, exploring alternatives to single-
member districting plans - and their accompanying racial
gerrymandering - becomes increasingly appealing as a means
of overcoming voting discrimination.
4. A New Consensus?
Exactly one year after handing down Shaw, the Supreme
Court issued two rulings that continued the debate on the
proper interpretation of the Voting Rights Act. In Johnson v.
DeGrandy, °6 the Court denied a claim of vote dilution by
Hispanics and blacks in Dade County, Florida, after a three-
judge panel at the District Court level ruled in their favor. The
plaintiffs, claiming that population patterns justified the cre-
ation of two additional Hispanic districts, challenged an appor-
tionment plan for the state legislature that resulted in the
creation of nine Hispanic districts in the House. °7
Finding that Hispanics enjoyed "roughly proportional"
representation under the plan in question, the Court rejected
the vote dilution claim and the concept that protected groups
argues that such districting plans can survive strict scrutiny given the history
of discrimination in voting. See Rand, supra note 191, at 750.
203 Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993).
203 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistrict-
ing: Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588
(1993).
205 See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 184, at 575-87.
206 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994).
207 Plaintiffs had also challenged the existence of three state Senate
districts, asserting that it would be possible to carve out a total of four.
However, the lower court rejected the latter claim. DeGrandy v. Wetherell,
815 F. Supp. 1550 (N.D. Fla. 1992).
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are entitled to maximum representation under the Voting
Rights Act.2 °" Writing for the majority, Justice David Souter,
who had issued a strong dissent in Shaw, stated:
We hold that no violation... can be found here, where,
in spite of continuing discrimination and racial bloc vot-
ing, minority voters form effective voting majorities in
a number of districts roughly proportional to the mi-
nority voters' respective shares in the voting-age popu-
lation. °9
Justice Souter continued, "One might suspect vote dilution from
political famine, but one is not entitled to suspect (much less
infer) dilution from mere failure to guarantee a political
feast.
210
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor explained:
The critical issue in this case is whether... the Voting
Rights Act ... requires courts to "maximize" the num-
ber of districts in which minority voters may elect their
candidates of choice .... The Court today makes it
clear that the Voting Rights Act does not require maxi-
mization.211
Although the Court used proportionality to measure the level of
opportunity afforded minorities in this case, it also emphasized
that proportionality, while relevant in determining vote dilution,
is not in itself dispositive.
Despite the distinct facts surrounding Shaw and Johnson,
the decisions consistently exhibit an underlying philosophical
disposition toward judicial restraint. The Court now appears
more reluctant than ever before in the last three decades to
intrude in state and local politics when such involvement is
legally avoidable. In each case, a lower court ruling that re-
structured an electoral process was thrown out and found
unwarranted under the terms of the Voting Rights Act. This
pattern persists in the companion case handed down with the
2. Johnson v. DeGrandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2653.
209 id.
210 Id. at 2660.
211 Id. at 2664 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Johnson opinion. If the seven-person majority2 in Johnson
suggests the emergence of a consensus on the Court regarding
voting rights, that impression evaporates with the accompany-
ing decision.
In Holder v. Hall,213 the Supreme Court overturned a
ruling by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The appellate
court found that the existence of a single-member commission
with executive and legislative powers in rural Bleckley County
violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and suggested that
the commission could be modeled after the county's school board
election system, which included five electoral districts, one of
which was predominantly black.214 Once again, the Supreme
Court refrained from intervening in local politics. In Holder,
however, the Justices' opinions were splintered, revealing some
deep-seated differences among the members.
Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor holding that no legal
benchmark existed for assessing the size of a governmental body
and rejecting the claim of vote dilution.215 Justices Blackmun,
Ginsberg, Souter and Stevens filed a dissenting opinion holding
that the size of a governing body is subject to review under the
Voting Rights Act, and that "minority voters may challenge the
dilutive effects of this practice by demonstrating their potential
to elect representatives under an objectively reasonable alterna-
tive practice. '211 Justices Thomas and Scalia joined the major-
ity in striking down the appellate decision, but in a separate
opinion, they summoned their colleagues to reassess the Court's
interpretation of Section 2.217
The long and controversial concurrence written by Justice
Thomas begins with the assertion that the Voting Rights Act
"was originally perceived as a remedial provision directed
212 In addition to Justice Souter, the majority in this case included Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Ginsberg, O'Connor and Stevens.
Justice Kennedy joined all parts of the majority opinion except III.B.2, III.B.4,
and IV.
213 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994).
214 Holder v. Hall, 955 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1992).
211 "[T]he search for a benchmark is quite problematic when a section 2
dilution challenge is brought to the size of a government body. There is no
principled reason why one size should be picked over another as a benchmark
for comparison." Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. at 2586.
216 Id. at 2619 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
217 id. at 2591-2619 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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specifically at eradicating discriminatory practices that restrict-
ed blacks' ability to register and vote in the segregated
South.""' Justice Thomas targets for re-examination the en-
tire body of case law regarding vote-dilution claims, declaring,
"In construing the Act to cover claims of vote dilution, we have
converted the Act into a devise for regulating, rationing, and
apportioning political power among racial and ethnic
groups." '219 Justice Thomas cites Shaw quite extensively to
support his argument that districting schemes implemented at
the behest of the courts may actually contribute to racial seg-
regation and political polarization.22 ° However, unlike Shaw,
this opinion moves beyond a critique of racial gerrymandering,
and questions whether the courts appropriately may consider
vote-dilution claims. Justice Thomas' opinion drew a strong
rebuttal from dissenting Justices in Holder, highlighting deep
divisions that remain on the Court even as it seriously rethinks
its proper role in the political process.2 '
III. JUSTICE WITHOUT BOUNDS
A. THE LIMITS OF GERRYMANDERING
As we celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of its passage, the
Voting Rights Act - or more precisely its interpretation by the
courts - remains a major object of contention among legal
scholars and political scientists on both the left and right of the
political spectrum. A brief review of the Act's history has shown
that courts' definitions of voting rights have become more
expansive and that courts have more aggressively entered the
218 Id. at 2592.
219 Id.
" Justice Thomas found that:
A review of the current state of our cases shows that by construing
the Act to cover potentially dilutive electoral mechanisms, we have
immersed the federal courts in a hopeless project of weighing
questions of political theory - questions judges must confront to es-
tablish a benchmark concept of an 'undiluted' vote. Worse, in
pursuing the ideal measure of voting strength, we have devised a
remedial mechanism that encourages federal courts to segregate
voters into racially designated districts to ensure minority electoral
success.
Id. at 2591-92.
22,Id. at 2625-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol.4:199
"political thicket" to enforce these rights as they see fit. Now
these practices are being questioned by members of the Su-
preme Court itself. In an attempt to explain the evolving
definition of voting rights by the judiciary, Pamela Karlan
conceptualizes voting as a three-part continuum of political
activity: voting as participation, voting as aggregation, and
voting as governance.222
Voting as participation concerns the fundamental franchise
and the courts' elimination of such blatant limitations on voting
as poll taxes, literacy tests, and white primaries."' According
to Karlan, the principal value sought in these early cases was
"civic inclusion," which pertains to "a sense of connectedness to
the community and of equal political dignity."2" This feeling
of belonging motivates people to accept the decisions of public
bodies and provides government with legitimacy.2" The right
to vote indicates one's full citizenship in a community. By
contemporary standards, courts' protection of such basic voting
rights constitutes the least controversial aspect of judicial inter-
vention.
Voting as aggregation concerns the way collective participa-
tion influences the outcome of electoral contests. 226 Unlike
participation claims involving individual rights, aggregation
222 Pamela S. Karlan, The Right to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formal-
ism, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1705, 1709-20 (1993).
223 Id. at 1709-10.
224 Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic
Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
173, 180 (1989). For a detailed discussion of the concept of civic inclusion, see
id. at 179-99.
22 For a discussion of the act of voting and political participation as an
inherently self-fulfilling and valuable experience, see ROBERT A. DAHL &
EDWARD R. TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 41-66 (1973); CAROL PATEMAN,
PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 1-44 (1970); JUDITH N. SCHLAR,
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 27 (1991). See generally
Kathryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up": Minority Political Participation and
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449 (1988) (discussing
political participation of minorities); Robert A. Dahl, The City and the Future
of Democracy, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 953 (1967). For a more detailed dis-
cussion of the sources of political legitimacy in political systems, see DAVID
EASTON, A SYsTEMs ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 278-310 (1965). For a tech-
nical essay on the assessment of legitimacy in political systems, see M.
Stephen Weatherford, Measuring Political Legitimacy, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
149 (1992).
226 Karlan, supra note 222, at 1712-13.
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claims are group based.2 ' Plaintiffs charge that while a par-
ticular protected group (or groups) has been allowed to vote, the
system of voting does not allow the group to actually elect
candidates of its choice. Such litigation is more complex be-
cause it requires evidence of some form of vote dilution, which
is not always a simple burden to meet. Litigation constructed
around these group claims tends to be controversial for at least
two reasons. First, courts have been inconsistent, perhaps even
ambivalent, in defining violations. For example, as Karlan
explains, although both the Voting Rights Act and subsequent
court decisions have refrained from using proportional represen-
tation as an absolute standard of fairness, they have applied
proportional representation as one of several means for mea-
suring vote dilution."' Second, courts' aggressive involvement
in crafting remedies to vote dilution grievances has raised
questions as to whether courts have stepped over the line of
legitimate involvement in the political process.229
Voting as governance concerns the manner in which group
interests are represented in the governmental decision-making
process.mo In this sense, voting is not perceived as an end in
itself, but as the means to influencing public policy through the
selection of delegates to a legislative body. While this dimen-
sion of Karlan's continuum is not as central to the ongoing
scholarly dialogue on voting rights, it is certainly relevant.23'
See Issacharoff, supra note 39, at 1840-41.
Karlan, supra note 222, at 1713-15. Here, she points to Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), and White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), as
indications of the Court's unwillingness to apply proportional representation
as an absolute standard even though it is the most elegant measurement of
vote dilution extant, and one which is regularly used with other factors to
assess the merits of a claim. See also Deutsch, supra note 183; Sanford
Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional
Representation: Why Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 257 (1985) (dis-
cussing the appropriateness of court intervention as a means of resolving
gerrymandering issues).
One of the strongest and most controversial arguments against this
form of judicial intervention appears in ABIGAIL M. THERNsTROM, WHOSE
VOTES CoUNT? AFFIRMATIvE AcTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 230-243
(1987).
"o On the concept of interest representation, see PITKIN, supra note 64, at
190-208. See also supra note 78.
"' Among legal scholars, Lani Guinier has paid particular attention to the
issue of governance. See Lani Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the
Post Reagan Era, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 393, 393-435 (1989); Lani
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In fact, one can argue that effective interest representation is
indeed the ultimate question in a democratic political pro-
cess.2 32 Just as one might assert that the right to vote - or
participate, to use Karlan's term - can be diluted if groups are
not permitted to strategically aggregate ballots, one can reason-
ably claim that the significance of selecting a representative is
reduced when a chosen delegate lacks the institutional power to
advance the group's interest.
My own assessment is that Voting Rights Act legislation
fails to recognize this final dimension of the voting continuum,
thereby leaving the courts incapable of discovering remedies to
the problem. In a later part of this article I will argue that the
problem of effectively representing the demands of all groups
goes to the heart of the democratic process. Stated another
way, the fundamental dilemma of a majoritarian form of govern-
ment is the effective advancement of minority interests. I
contend that no real resolution to this classic democratic dilem-
ma can be reached in a governmental system such as ours. Its
effects upon minority populations, however, may be modified in
order to minimize minority underrepresentation. Unfortunately,
the remedial strategy adopted by the courts - focusing on the
creation of safe single-member districts for aggrieved par-
ties - magnifies and perpetuates the negative effects of
majoritarian government. Before developing these arguments,
I will first review some of the common criticisms launched
against the standard approach. These may be summarized as
follows:
a. Single-member districting schemes often involve an
inappropriate intrusion by the courts in the political
process;
b. The creation of safe districts can violate the voting
rights of the majority population and unprotected
minorities;
Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L.
REV. 1413 (1991) [hereinafter No Two Seats]; Triumph of Tokenism, supra
note 58. See also Kathryn Abrams, Relationships of Representation in Voting
Rights Act Jurisprudence, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1409 (1993) (suggesting statutory
provisions which would eliminate gerrymandering).
232 Karlan argues that the one-person, one-vote standard adopted by the
Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), was actually meant
to protect the governance rights of the majority who were legally entitled to be
put in legislative districts that enjoyed proportionate institutional representa-
tion. Karlan, supra note 222, at 1717-19.
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c. Single-member districting schemes do not serve the
interests of all protected groups alike;
d. Single-member districting schemes do not always
provide effective remedies to vote dilution and may, in
fact, exacerbate the problem;
e. Single-member districting schemes are based on the
questionable presumption that group interests are
defined primarily by race;
f. Single-member districting schemes can contribute to
racially polarized voting and a general climate of racial
competition and animosity; and
g. Single-member districting schemes do not provide
any assurances that protected groups will effectively
participate in governing.
1. The Courts and Majority Interests.
Once the courts began to define voting rights in terms of
aggregate claims, they opened the door to a bevy of commentary
about the propriety of the role that the judicial branch had
assumed in the political process. In the most detailed criticism
of voting rights litigation to date, Thernstrom looked back at the
original purpose of the Act, which she described simply as voter
registrationY 3  She argued that even though the 1982
Amendments did not guarantee proportional representation or
outlaw at-large voting, subsequent action in the courts essen-
tially resulted in a rewriting of the law to promote the former
and restrict the latter."
Thernstrom placed particular blame on Justice Department
attorneys "who invent law as they enforce it" and act as a
surrogate for the courts by subjecting "the broad and subtle
question of equal electoral opportunity" to administrative
review.3 5 Thernstrom rejected the idea that only blacks can
represent blacks, contending that candidates often are elected
by biracial coalitions and, therefore, are capable of responding
23 THERNSTROM, supra note 229, at ix.
4 Id. at 230-37. Thernstrom points to Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124
(1971), and White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), as the basis for the
standards set in the 1982 Amendments, and notes that neither
disproportionately low minority office-holding nor black residential clustering
were held sufficient to make a claim. Thernstrom, supra note 229, at 194.
m35 Id. at 236-37.
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to a broader range of interests." 6 Holding that the Constitu-
tion does not guarantee representation, she decried an unneces-
sary intrusion into politics by the courts. 7
Other scholars have observed a decided shift in judicial
thinking that has placed the courts squarely in the middle of
the reapportionment process. 8' Howard and Howard drew an
analytic distinction between the racial equality norm and the
political equality norm. 9 The racial equality norm, derived
from Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects
citizens against governmental action that discriminates on the
basis of arbitrary characteristics such as race. The political-
equality norm, also derived from Article I, Section 2 and the
Equal Protection Clause, guarantees the right of citizens to
216 Id. at 215.
" Thernstrom's book has received strong criticism. See Pamela S. Karlan
& Peyton McCrary, Without Fear or Research: Abigail Thernstrom on the
Voting Rights Act, 4 J.L. & POL. 751 (1988).
'8 Wells focuses on several key decisions that highlight a diversity of
opinions regarding the extent to which the courts might use districting as a
means of influencing the outcome of electoral contests. See Wells, 9 Poly Stud.
J. at 863-74. He starts with the decision in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960), where, in his opinion, the Court struck down a legislative plan
that would single out a segment of the population for special treatment.
Wells, supra at 867. He compares Gomillion to Gaffney v. Cummings, 412
U.S. 753, 754 (1973), in which the Court, ruling on a plan designed to allocate
districts between Democrats and Republicans, found such "benevolent biparti-
san gerrymandering" not only acceptable but admirable. Wells, supra, at 863.
He also points to United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), in which
the Court stated, "Neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment
mandates any per se rule against using racial factors in districting and
apportionment." Wells, supra, at 866 (citing United Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at
160). Chief Justice Warren Burger's dissenting opinion in United Jewish Orgs.
is particularly interesting in this context: "If Gomillion teaches us anything,
I had thought it was that drawing of political boundary lines with the sole,
explicit objective of reaching a predetermined racial result can not ordinarily
be squared with the Constitution." Wells, supra, at 867 (citing United Jewish
Org., 430 U.S. at 181). Wells takes note of a similar dissenting opinion written
by Justice William 0. Douglas in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66 (1964),
where the Justice stated, "The principle of equality is at war with the notion
that District A must be represented by a Negro (and) that District B must be
represented by a Caucasian.... That ... is a divisive force in a communi-
ty.... Government has no business designing electoral districts along racial
or religious lines." Wells, supra, at 868 (citing Wright, 376 U.S. at 66).
" Alan Howard & Bruce Howard, The Dilemma of the Voting Rights Act -
Recognizing the Emerging Political Equality Norm, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 1615
(1983).
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participate in elections on an equal footing." ° This emergent
standard of political equality, according to Howard and Howard,
prohibits the government from participating in actions designed
to influence the outcome of an election."4
Howard and Howard took particular aim at the creation of
"safe districts" that increase the probability of electing represen-
tatives with specific racial characteristics. Like Thernstrom,
they saw the Court, despite claims to the contrary, abandoning
a neutral political stance and moving toward an implicit goal of
proportional representation. They recognized the increased use
of safe districting as a means to remedy past discrimination and
integrate blacks into the political process - all in pursuit of the
racial equality norm."4 Howard and Howard, however, found
the practice conflicts with the political equality norm. Specifi-
cally, they argued that granting any voter group or interest an
arbitrary advantage in choosing representatives is tantamount
to unequal treatment.2 4  If the architects of the plan have
performed their task proficiently, residents of safe districts who
240 Id. Howard and Howard trace the emergence of this norm to decisions
in the mid-1960s and early 1970s, e.g. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336
(1972); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-28 (1969); Harp-
er v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); Howard & Howard,
supra, at 1617. However, they recognize its principal application with regard
to the specific right of an equally weighted vote, as required in the one-person,
one-vote doctrine in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
241 The authors point to Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), in which the
Court first found justiciable a challenge to inequitable districting on the basis
of the Equal Protection Clause and prohibited "arbitrary government interfer-
ence that disfavors ... [certain voters] in the process of selecting represen-
tatives." Howard & Howard, supra note 239, at 1649. Howard and Howard
detected as an evolving political equality the norm against excessive enforce-
ment of the one-person, one-vote standard in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725
(1983). Here, four dissenting justices warned against the use of political
gerrymanders as a serious "potential threat to equality of representation."
Howard & Howard, supra note 239, at 1638-39 (citing Karcher, 462 U.S. at
776).
242 Howard & Howard, supra note 239, at 1620-32. In subsequent decisions
concerning other types of civil rights suits, a plurality of the Court held that
racial classifications require strict scrutiny no matter what their purpose or
who the beneficiary. See City of Richmond v. J- Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493-98 (1988); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986). See
Sperling, supra note 202, at 284.
" Howard & Howard, supra note 239, at 1633-40. This position is more
recently argued by Yanos, see supra note 58.
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are not members of a targeted protected group have little
chance of electing one of their own.
Many voting rights advocates would contend that the
transgression is well worth it; if the involvement of the courts in
political contests advances the goal of racial equality, then so be
it. We have seen that the level of judicial intervention needed
to create safe districts is quite substantial. For example, taking
into consideration social demographics and past political behav-
ior, drawing boundaries that allow protected groups to enjoy
majority status is not sufficient; a sixty-five percent popular
margin is called for to guarantee a desired electoral result. The
entire process of racial gerrymandering is indeed presumptuous.
The process assumes not only that all members of protected
groups define their political interests primarily on the basis of
race, but also that these interests are generally at odds with
majority interests. Such political engineering has all the mak-
ings of a self-fulfilling prophecy, for it forces people into allianc-
es solely on the basis of race and undermines social policies that
were consciously designed to promote racial integration.'
Racial gerrymandering represents an aggressive and far
reaching form of judicial policymaking and strikes at the heart
of the political process. Its desirability and necessity remain a
matter of vigorous debate, especially in light of Shaw. One
should keep in mind that nothing in the Constitution or the
Voting Rights Act requires the adoption of safe districts for
aggrieved groups. Safe districts are a remedy developed within
the courts at the urging of litigants and their expert witnesses.
In assessing whether such intrusive public action is worthwhile,
we return to the original dilemma defined by Howard and
Howard, who warned against compromising the political equali-
ty norm: Does the creation of safe districts promote racial
equality?
24 For example, if I am a member of a racial minority living in a minority
district, I have a political disincentive to move into a predominantly white
district where interests have been predefined as being in conflict with mine.
Likewise if I am a white person living in a predominantly white district, then
I assume a political risk by moving into a minority district whose interests are
pre-determined as being contrary to mine. See Katharine Inglis Butler,
Reapportionment, the Courts and the Voting Rights Act: A Resegregation of
the Political Process?, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 11-33 (1984).
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2. What's Good for Minorities?
The social science research reviewed above demonstrates
that single-member districting schemes do not benefit all minor-
ities alike. In order for such plans to result in a safe bet for a
particular group, the group must be geographically concentrated
and relatively large in size. A significant amount of evidence
indicates that Hispanics and Asians, who are sometimes better
integrated residentially and less numerous than blacks, do not
enjoy comparable benefits from single-member districts, making
it more difficult to design a safe district for them.' Addition-
ally, blacks reap such advantages only when district boundaries
can be drawn to create a supermajority of black residents. 6
Political gerrymandering at the behest of the courts pro-
vides little advantage to minorities who are not specifically
protected by the Voting Rights Act, but who actually may be
victimized by potent forms of discrimination. Most of the gay
community, for example, is not residentially segregated, but has
clearly defined political interests. Only on rare occasions have
apportionment plans been designed to accommodate a gay
district.2 7 One might argue that the smaller, less concentrat-
ed and more politically weak a group is, the less likely the
group's interests will be considered in the districting process.
Apportionment is by definition a highly politicized exercise in
See supra II.B.5-7.
6See supra II.B.8.
27 The redistricting scheme that was adopted in 1990 for the City Council
of New York City did, in fact, include a "gay district." This was possible in
New York because the gay community is highly organized and, notwithstand-
ing its dispersement throughout the city, enjoys residential concentrations in
certain city neighborhoods. In this case the district was carved out of the
Chelsea and West Village areas. For an analysis, see Robert W. Bailey,
Protecting an Unprotected Minority in Urban Legislative Districting: Gay
Voters and Council Districting in New York City, paper prepared for delivery
at the annual meeting of the New York State Political Science Association,
Apr. 24, 1994. For a general description of the redistricting process in New
York, see Macchiarola & Diaz, supra note 189; Frank J. Macchiarola & Joseph
G. Diaz, Minority Political Empowerment in New York City, 108 POL. SCI Q.
37, 41-49 (1993); Frank J. Macchiarola & Joseph G. Diaz, Decisionmaking in
the Redistricting Process: Approaching Fairness, 19 J. LEGIS. 199, 201-211
(1993). For more critical assessments of the New York City plan, see Judith
Reed, Of Boroughs, Boundaries and Bullwinkles: The Limitations of Single-
Member Districts in a Multiracial Context, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 759, 764-80
(1992); Yanos, supra note 58, at 1842-57.
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allocating influence, and notwithstanding judicial oversight,
apportionment is usually controlled by those who already have
power.
Single-member districting schemes originally were designed
to provide relief for blacks who enjoy legal protection under the
Voting Rights Act, who are often large in number, and who are
usually concentrated geographically. But even for those blacks
who benefit from such plans, the advantages are limited and
come at a price. If the courts' inclination to define group inter-
ests according to race is presumptuous, then the primary vic-
tims of such judicial arrogance are blacks. Surely no reasonable
person would understate the significance of racial politics in a
nation where racial discrimination has historically been part of
the civic culture. Nevertheless, at times, political preferences
and voting choices are made on the basis of other criteria. If I
am a black Catholic lesbian, I may choose to define some issues
on the basis of my race, others on the basis of my religion, some
on the basis of my gender, and still others on the basis of my
sexual orientation. My personal calculation of how to vote on a
political issue or how to choose a candidate becomes somewhat
complicated and unpredictable, but the choices should be mine,
and not be prejudged or limited by the action of the courts.
Even if the courts happen to make the correct choices for
me in defining group interest, the powers I enjoy as a resident
of a "safe district" are undermined by the very process in ques-
tion. Lani Guinier has pointed out that single-member
districting schemes function to deny minorities "authentic repre-
sentation" because, however homogeneous a district is, candi-
dates are motivated to build coalitions among diverse groups in
order to win.' Therefore, such candidates make compromises
and generally advance a middle-of-the-road agenda that may
not accommodate the specific needs of blacks. This makes the
election of third-party candidates or individuals with unortho-
dox viewpoints nearly impossible. The "winner-take-all" rules of
single-member districting plans also lead to wasted votes. If I
am a member of a voting minority in a safe district, my candi-
date is predestined to lose, and for all practical purposes,
according to Guinier, my vote is wasted. 9
248 See Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The Ques-
tion of Single-Member Districts, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135, 1152 (1993).
249 Id. at 1151-1163. This argument is seemingly difficult to reconcile with
the previous one. If candidates running for office are forced to the "middle of
the road" by the voting minority or minorities, then these minorities have had
an effect on the political process, and their votes are not really wasted. Here,
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3. Minority Interest Representation
The ultimate flaw in the use of apportionment strategies to
achieve racial equality is found at the governance level."' In
order to produce safe districts for minority candidates, racial
districting also must lead to the creation of safe districts for the
majority. As a function of both definition and mathematics, safe
districting results in more white districts than black. Given the
sixty-five-percent rule, racial gerrymandering requires minori-
ties to be highly concentrated into a relatively small number of
safe districts. This concentration assures minority status to
black representatives in the policy-making process, whether in
a legislative body or on a public board that is governed by the
principle of majority rule. Furthermore, representatives elected
from safe majority districts containing few or no minority con-
stituents possess little political motivation to sympathize with
minority interests.
Guinier proposes the adoption of semi-proportional voting
systems as an alternative to racial gerrymandering." Mini-
mally, semi-proportional voting allows people to vote according
to interest rather than geography. However, most important of
all, this system permits voters to define their own interest as
they choose.252 Therefore, in any given election, a voter may
the important issue again is the size of the voting minority. If the voting
minority is large enough to form part of a winning coalition, then its votes
count, even if only to push the candidate towards the middle. If the voting
minority is small and insignificant enough to be discounted by a majority
candidate, then perhaps the minorty votes are wasted.
250 This point is made by Guinier throughout several of her papers. See No
Two Seats, supra note 231, at 1458-93; Representation of Minority Interests,
supra note 248, at 1138-50; Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 58. It is also
effectively argued in Karlan, supra note 224, at 199-213; Pamela S. Karlan,
Undoing the Right Thing: Single Member Offices and the Voting Rights Act,
77 VA. L. REV. 1, 29, 39 (1991) [hereinafter Undoing the Right Thing].
251 For a recent presentation, see Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation,
and Race Conscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEx. L.
REV. 1617, 1641 (1993). Although Guinier makes a general case for semi-
proportional voting, most of her writing emphasizes cumulative voting as an
alternative to single-member districts.
252 The umbrella of semi-proportional systems includes a variety of
systems. Cumulative voting grants each voter as many ballot choices as there
are positions to be filled in a multi-member race. Voters may allocate these
ballots among as many candidates as they choose, allowing minorities, or any
interest for that matter, to concentrate their support among a particular
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decide to pool her interest with others on the basis of race, eth-
nicity, gender, sexual orientation, profession, philosophy, neigh-
borhood, or issue. These crucial choices are not mediated by the
courts or a districting commission.
Under semi-proportional systems, the population threshold
for electing a representative is less than fifty percent. There-
fore, individuals and groups select from a full range of candi-
dates. This functionally increases the political efficacy of small
groups and opens the political system to candidates and political
parties that typically lie on the fringe of mainstream politics. In
the end, these balloting mechanisms improve the opportunity
for what Guinier calls authentic representation, and they reduce
the casting of wasted votes. If the system Guinier advocates
operates as it should, the result will be not only fair representa-
tion for racial minorities, but also a general reconfiguration of
the political process that is more pluralistic.2 3  Representa-
tion of diverse interests at the level of governance reduces the
probability of forming a dominant majority. Consequently,
representation increases the capacity of minorities to negotiate
as viable forces within a governing coalition. While Guinier's
position is anti-majoritarian, her proposal is no less democratic
than the system to which we are accustomed in most localities.
But will it work?
B. CUMULATIVE VOTING
1. The Simple Arithmetic
For Americans, single-member districts are the norm of
politics. Most Western democracies, however, use some form of
candidate. Limited voting grants each voter a number of ballots that is less than
the total number of positions to be filled, serving to dilute the advantage en-
joyed by political majorities. See Edward Sill, Alternatives to Single-Member
Districts, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 37, at 249-58. These
systems vary in principle from proportional representational schemes that
attempt to achieve a more direct relationship between voter choice and repre-
sentation. For a discussion of the latter, see DOUGLAS AMY, REAL CHOICES,
NEW VOICES: THE CASE FOR PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES 21-41 (1993); Sill, supra, at 258-263; Leon Weaver, The
Rise, Decline, and Resurrection of Proportional Representation in Local
Government in the United States, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR CONSE-
QUENCES, supra note 62, at 191.
' Other scholars have argued a similar position. See Karlan, supra note
224, at 213-36; Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing, supra note 250, at 41-45;
Reed, supra note 247, at 179-80.
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proportional voting system.1 4 Single-member systems persist
today only in those countries once ruled by the British crown,
such as Great Britain, Canada, and New Zealand, as well as
the United States.255 Since the founding of the United States,
proportional representation has existed in nearly two dozen
American cities,256 but in its pure form it is found today in
only two places: Cambridge, Massachusetts (both the city coun-
cil and the school board) and New York City (community school
board elections).
Semi-proportional systems, although they are less confusing
to voters and more straightforward to operate, also are a rarity
on the contemporary American landscape. Throughout the
twentieth century, cumulative voting was used in only one
circumstance: the election of members of the Illinois State
House of Representatives, where the practice was ended in
1980. In 1987 cumulative voting was instituted to elect part of
the City Council in Alamogordo, New Mexico. Its adoption
resulted from a court settlement that emerged after claims of
vote dilution by Hispanics and blacks. 57 Beginning in 1987,
several local jurisdictions adopted cumulative voting voluntarily
as an alternative to at-large systems that courts found dis-
criminatory.2 11 In April 1994 a U.S. District Court ordered
Worcester County, Maryland to introduce cumulative voting for
its county commissioner elections after the court found evidence
of vote dilution in the existing at-large system.2 9
The attraction of cumulative voting as a mechanism for
improving minority representation is a matter of simple arith-
metic. Under cumulative voting, the threshold ofexclusion-that
9 Countries that use some form of proportional voting system include
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
AMY, supra note 252, at 2; ENID LAKEMAN, POWER TO ELECT: THE POWER FOR
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION (1982).
AMY, supra note 252, at 2.
"6 These include Boulder, Kalamazoo, Sacramento, Cambridge, Cleveland,
Cincinnati, Toledo, New York, and Wheeling. AMY, supra note 253, at 10.
Vega v. City of Alamogordo, Civ. No. 86-0061-C (D.C. N.Mex. 1987).
28 In addition to Alamogordo, New Mexico, cumulative voting is used today
in Peoria, Illinois; the municipalities of Centre, Guin, and Myrtlewood,
Alabama; the County Commission and Board of Education in Chilton County,
Alabama; and the Sisseten, South Dakota School District. Engstrom &
Barrilleaux, supra note 2, at 388 n.2.
" Cane v. Worcester County, 847 F. Supp. 369 (D.Md. 1994).
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proportion of the electorate a group must exceed in order to
successfully elect a candidate - is significantly lower than that
needed in a majoritarian system, where the threshold is fifty
percent.2 10 In a four-seat election, for example, the threshold
of exclusion would be twenty percent. Any group that contains
more than twenty percent of the population could elect a candi-
date if it "plumped" all of its votes for that one person. This
threshold varies inversely with the number of seats being filled.
Therefore, the greater the number of seats contested, the small-
er the number of the threshold of votes needed to elect a candi-
date.2
2. Cane v. Worcester County
In January 1994 a group of citizens successfully sued
Worcester County, Maryland, claiming that its system for
electing county commissioners violated Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act.262 Under the challenged plan, the entire elector-
ate voted at-large for candidates for each of five seats, four of
which corresponded to four residency districts, and one of which
was a countywide commissioner. When the defendants failed to
provide the U.S. District Court with an acceptable remedial
260 The threshold of exclusion = 1/1 + (number of seats) x 100. This
coefficient is based upon the following assumptions: majority voters cast all of
their votes, none of the majority votes are cast for the minority candidate,
majority votes are concentrated on a number of candidates equal to the
number of seats being filled, majority votes are divided evenly among candi-
dates. Richard L. Engstrom et al., Cumulative Voting as a Remedy for Minori-
ty Vote Dilution, 5 J.L. & POL. 469, 478-79 (1989) [hereinafter Cumulative
Voting as a Remedy]; See also Richard L. Engstrom, Modified Multi-Seat
Election Systems as Remedies for Minority Vote Dilution, 21 STETSON L. REV.
743, 750 (1992).
261 For example, using the formula presented in note 260, the relationship
between the number of positions competed for and the threshold of exclusion
would be as follows:









Cumulative Voting. as a Remedy, supra note 260, at 479.
262 Cane v. Worcester County, 840 F. Supp. 1081, 1081-82 (D.Md. 1994).
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plan, the plaintiffs offered the court two alternative proposals:
a single-member district arrangement, or a cumulative voting
plan. Two aspects make Cane particularly interesting:
First, unlike previous cases in which cumulative voting schemes
were accepted by challenged jurisdictions on a voluntary basis,
here the court imposed the plan. Second, in light of Shaw v.
Reno2 and the criticisms of racial gerrymandering reviewed
above, the court's rationale in accepting cumulative voting over
single-member districts is noteworthy. The Cane court calcu-
lated the threshold of exclusion, and under a single-member
plan, one of the five districts in the county would have a black
voting-age population that constituted sixty-two percent of the
total. The court found that a fifty-percent threshold of exclusion
gave blacks a "realistic opportunity to elect a candidate of their
choice. '265 Under cumulative voting, however, the threshold
was computed at 16.7%.266 Because blacks made up
19.16%267 of the population, cumulative voting also offered
them an opportunity to elect their own candidate.
Of primary concern to the court in Cane was the level of
judicial intervention necessary to craft a remedy: both intrusion
into the existing political system, and intrusion into the person-
al prerogatives of voters. Because the existing electoral system
was based upon at-large voting, cumulative voting "would not
disturb the existing structure of government" as would a
districting scheme."' This is a rather interesting observation,
given the thirty-year history of the Voting Rights Act, in which
the courts replaced at-large districting plans with single-mem-
ber plans as a matter of course.
In Cane, the court deemed cumulative voting to be less
intrusive because of the choices it allowed for the voters them-
selves. As the court stated, "[clumulative voting, unlike single
member districts, will allow the voters, by the way they exercise
their votes, to 'district' themselves based on what they think
rather than where they live.
269
26 Cane v. Worcester County, 847 F. Supp. 369, 370-71 (D.Md. 1994).
264 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
26 1 Id. at 372.
266 Id.
267 id.
26 8 d. at 373.
269 Id.
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Finally, the court took up the question of polarization and
the risks involved when the courts take it upon themselves to
make choices for voters as to how those voters might define
their own political interests: "[clumulative voting is less likely
to increase polarization between different interests since no
group receives special treatment at the expense of others as
would occur in a single member district with one black majority
district. 270
Although the language of Cane was not nearly as provoca-
tive as the warning of "political apartheid" sounded in Shaw v.
Reno,27' the Cane opinion made some cogent points about the
policy options before the courts. Cane advanced considerations
about the relative effectiveness of remedies, the preferable, if
not proper, role of the courts in the "political thicket," and the
effect judicial action could have in separating the races. Refer-
ring in passing to the "special treatment" '272 afforded some
through the creation of safe districts, the court even hinted at
the possibility that racial gerrymandering might be unfair to
certain groups. Nevertheless, Cane was a strong decision. In no
way was the court blind to the issue of race, and the decision
was not a return to what Karlan might refer to as the first
dimension of voting rights: mere participation or inclusion in
the political process."' Cane responded to a group claim of
racial vote dilution, to the point that the court rejected a remedy
proposed by the defendant as being ineffective.
In Cane, the court seemed to calculate the opportunity costs
involved with the respective choices. The court's goal was to
intervene in a local political matter to the extent that was
needed to resolve a constitutional violation. But the court
sought to do so in a way that would not cross beyond the bound-
aries of what some might perceive to be legitimate judicial
action. Whether the Maryland court was guided by Shaw v.
Reno is purely speculative, since Cane did not cite this Supreme
Court ruling. In assessing the risks involved in choosing be-
tween two apparently effective alternatives, however, the Cane
court reasonably suggested that Shaw v. Reno raises the risk
factor in selecting a plan that involves racial gerrymandering.
In this sense, cumulative voting stands out as a more sure-
footed legal strategy so long as it proves effective.
270 Id.
271 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993).
272 Cane, 847 F. Supp. at 373.
273 Karlan, supra note 222, at 1709-20.
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3. Empirical Evidence
The evidence of the effectiveness of cumulative voting is not
voluminous, but it is consistent. Cumulative voting serves as
an effective vehicle for electing minorities in local elections. The
voting data for three localities, Chilton County, Alabama;
Alamogordo, New Mexico; and Sisseton, South Dakota support
this conclusion. Chilton County was the most striking of these
cases because it involved five jurisdictions: the cities of Centre
and Guin, the town of Myrtlewood, the Chilton County Commis-
sion, and the Board of Education."
Prior to the institution of cumulative voting in Chilton
County, no blacks had been elected in any of these jurisdictions.
Through a series of consent decrees in 1987, the at-large
majoritarian systems in each of these jurisdictions was replaced
with a seven-candidate system of cumulative voting. Karlan
reports that, although in four of the jurisdictions, the total black
population, and therefore the black voting-age population and
black turnout, was slightly below the threshold of exclusion, a
black candidate was elected in all but one of the jurisdic-
tions."75 She indicates that the election data "strongly sug-
gest" that black success at the polls in these contests was
largely due to their ability to concentrate support behind a few
candidates. 6
Alamogordo, New Mexico, adopted a mixed voting system in
1987, where four council members were chosen from single-
member districts and three were elected at-large through
cumulative voting. Although the voting-age population was
twenty-one percent Hispanic and 4.9% black, no minority had
been elected since 1970.7 Exit polls in a 1987 election, in
which a Hispanic candidate was elected, indicated that the
change in the election procedure was crucial to her victory.75
274 Karlan, supra note 224, at 234.
27 Id. at 234-35. The one jurisdiction that did not elect a black candidate
was the City of Myrtlewood. Karlan also reports on the adoption of limited
voting systems in two dozen Alabama municipalities and in Granville County,
North Carolina, where the results in electing black candidates were equally
impressive. Id. at 225-30, 234 n. 255
26 Id. at 234-35.
277 Cumulative Voting as a Remedy, supra note 260, at 480-81.
278 Richard L. Cole et al., Cumulative Voting in a Municipal Election: A
Note on Voter Reactions and Electoral Consequences, 43 WEST. POL. Q. 191,
197-98 (1990).
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These results were repeated in the 1990 election. An analysis
of exit-poll data from the later contest indicated that voters
from both minority and Anglo groups developed positive atti-
tudes toward the system, although minorities were more in-
clined to use the plumping option." 9
In the Sisseton School District of South Dakota, Native
Americans constituted 33.9% of the residents."0 Under a
system of at-large voting that had been in place until 1989,
Native Americans were rarely elected to the board even though
tribal members regularly ran for office. On two occasions when
Native Americans had been elected, the leaders of the Sisseton-
Wahpeton Sioux claimed that these candidates had been hand-
picked by the Anglo majority and were not representatives of
the Native American population. 8' When the first election
using cumulative voting procedures was held in 1989, a Native
American ran first in a field of seven candidates. This assured
him of one of the three vacant seats on the nine-person board.
Once again, exit-poll data indicated that the election of a minor-
ity was determined by the opportunity to concentrate votes on
a particular candidate of choice.28 2
Evidence of the success of cumulative voting is compelling.
It provides a viable and effective mechanism for electing minori-
ties who constitute a small proportion of a population. This
system provides a clear advantage over single-member
districting plans. National studies demonstrate that single-
member plans accommodate only those groups who are large
enough to be fashioned into a local majority. Moreover, cumula-
tive voting works without necessitating the kinds of judicial
intrusions described in Cane. As Guinier and others have
argued, cumulative voting provides citizens with an opportunity
for real choice and authentic representation without wasting
votes.
Cumulative voting advances the cause of racial equality
without compromising the political equality norm.2 3 To refer
back to Karlan's continuum of voting,2  cumulative voting
constitutes an appropriate response to aggregate claims de-
279 Cole & Taebel, supra note 2, at 195.
280 Engstrom & Barrilleaux, supra note 2, at 389.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 390-91.
' See Howard & Howard, supra note 239, at 1615-16.
2 Karlan, supra note 222, at 1719.
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signed to combat vote dilution. However, as an instrument to
achieve full equality in a majoritarian system, cumulative
voting does have limitations. These limitations become evident
when voting is perceived in the context of the third element in
Karlan's continuum-governance.
When participation is understood as the capacity to effec-
tively represent group interests, minorities remain at a distinct
disadvantage in a governance system that operates according to
the principle of majority rule. This is particularly true when
interests are defined in terms of race. It is clear that a minority
group's ability to elect a minority to one of the seats of a govern-
ing body is better than being able to elect none. Nonetheless,
minorities in these jurisdictions remain in a weak political
position. Cumulative voting cannot cure the dilemma that ma-
jority rule fosters among those groups that have minority
status. As Madison might have instructed us, however, cumula-
tive voting may effectively counteract some of the adverse
effects of majority rule.
C. THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: MAJORITY AND MINORrTIEs
1. The Tyranny of the Majority
Lani Guinier focused on the fundamental dilemma of
republican democracy: the capacity to effectively represent the
interests of minorities in a system governed by majority rule.
The liberal philosopher John Stuart Mill recognized the threat
of a "tyranny of the majority" and warned his fellow Europeans
of the need to take precautions against such tyranny.28 On
his famous visit to America from France, Alexis de Tocqueville
cautioned us about the political and social omnipotence of the
' Mill observed that:
"The 'people' who exercise the power are not always the same people
with those over whom it is exercised; and the 'self-government'
spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but each by all
the rest. The will of the people, moreover practically means the will
of the most numerous or the most active part of the people; the
majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as
the majority; the people, consequently may desire to oppress a part
of their number; and precautions are as much needed against this
as against any other abuse of power ... in political speculations 'the
tyranny of the majority' is now generally included among the evils
among which society requires to be on its guard." JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY 5-6 (Gateway ed., 1955)(1859).
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majority, whose power he found to be the most conspicuous in
the legislature.286  But the political science of Madison has
most significantly affected American thinking not only in the
causes and threats of a "majority faction" but also in the ways
to control its negative effects.
287
Beyond the elimination of the liberties that allow people to
form their own opinion on political issues, Madison sought to
modify the threat of majority tyranny through the size and
diversity of the American people.288 Preoccupied with the
threat of ambitious and selfish factions that would use their
influence to compromise the general welfare of the Republic,
Madison took some comfort in the fact that the power of minori-
ty factions would be held in check by the force of majority rule.
But it was in the rule of the majority that the more significant
dangers could be found. Madison's prescription for the Ameri-
can republic was to expand and diversify; the more groups that
became active in politics, the less likely it was that a working
majority could be formed. The Madisonian vision of political life
was one populated with numerous competing groups that would
serve as a counterbalance to each other and as an obstacle to
the development of a sinister majority.
289
2 De Tocqueville noted: "Tyranny may be exercised by means of the law
itself.... In the United States the omnipotence of the majority ... is favorable to
the legal despotism of the legislature.... The majority has absolute authority
both to make the laws and to watch over their execution...." ALEXIS DE
TOcQuEvILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 272 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1945)(1833).
17 Madison warned that "[w]hen a majority is included in a faction, the
form of popular government ... enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or
interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens." THE FEDERALIST
No. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (New American Library ed., 1961).
' Madison proposed to "[e]xtend the sphere and you take in a greater
variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of
the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or
if such a common motive exists it will be more difficult for those who feel it to
discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other." Id. at 83.
2 Madison took up the issue of majority factions again in THE FEDERALIST
No. 51, (New American Library ed., 1961) at 320-25. For an analysis of
Madison's work, see DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE
FEDERALIST 59-110, 136-46 (1984). See also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 471-564 (1969).
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2. Pluralism and Local Politics
Madison's influence on American political science affected
how we would study, understand, and judge politics. An entire
generation of social scientists focused on the role of interest
groups in policy making.29 0 Pluralism became the paradigm
for explaining city politics from the 1950s through the
1970s. 2 1' Framed in Madisonian logic, pluralism also emerged
as an idealized defense of the institutions and process of local
government as we knew it.
Pluralism was a response to claims that American politics
could be dominated by either minority or majority factions.
Pluralists viewed power as "dispersed inequalities, ''29 2 and
politics as specialized, with varied groups controlling policy
making in different arenas of public policy. They felt that de-
centralization of power would make it difficult for any one small
minority elite to control government. In true Madisonian
fashion, pluralists perceived that the effective participation in
politics by so many diverse groups undermined the probability
of a ruling majority.293
This pluralist thinking is signficantly flawed. True, local
politics in America were open to a wide array of groups and
interests, creating certain assurances of political democracy at
m See ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1908); DAVID
TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1960).
21 The most influential work of the period was Robert A. Dahl's study of
New Haven. See DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (1966); NELSON W. PoLsBY, COMMu-
NITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY (1963). But the pluralist model was eventu-
ally applied in studies of other American cities, among which were WALLACE
SAYRE & HERBERT KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY (1960); AARON
WILDAVSKY, LEADERSHIP IN A SMALL TOWN (1964); FREDERICK M. WIRT,
POWER IN THE CITY: DECISION MAKING IN SAN FRANCISCO (1974).
22 DAHL, supra note 291, at 85-86.
s Dahl wrote:
Elections and political competition do not make for government by
majorities in any significant way, but they vastly increase the size,
number, and variety of minorities whose preferences must be taken
into account by leaders in making policy choices.... If majorities in
a democracy always govern in the broad meaning of the term, they
rarely rule in Madison's terms.... In the sense in which Madison
was concerned with the problem then, majority rule is mostly a
myth.... If majority rule is mostly a myth, then majority tyranny is
mostly a myth too.
ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 132, 133 (1956).
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the governance level. Many would participate but unfortunately
not all groups had access. Like Madison, the pluralists did not
anticipate the significance of racial politics or the system's
determination in ignoring, at least for a period of time, the
legitimate claims of blacks and other minority racial groups.294
Because of legislation such as the Voting Rights Act, local
politics is now more open than it was three decades ago. Con-
temporary political scientists are more astute in assessing the
role minorities and elites play in forming power structures with-
in cities. Today the conventional wisdom in the profession still
holds that neither a single majority nor an all-powerful elite
controls local politics. Instead, coalitions that elect candidates
and form governing regimes dominate politics." 5 Blacks are
often represented in these alignments. In fact, evidence indi-
cates that as minorities succeeded in electoral politics they also
have been able to substantially influence policymaking at the gover-
nance level.2 98
3. Pluralism and Racial Equality
Judging Madison by contemporary standards, it is evident
that the genius of his work, as appreciated by the pluralists,
was his understanding of group politics. Madison perceived
interests and political coalitions as transitory in nature.297
Nobody had to be relegated to a permanent minority station in
the lottery of interest group politics; anybody could be a winner.
The tragedy of racial gerrymandering is that this scheme
assures "protected groups" permanent minority status in a
majoritarian system. Racial gerrymandering reinforces a
tendency to define political interests in terms of race. A black
person living in a white district might conclude she has, as
2"94 For critical assessments of the pluralist model, see PETER BACHRACH,
THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELITISM (1967); PETER BACHRACH & MORTON S.
BARATZ, POWER AND POVERTY (1970); G.W. DOMHOFF, WHO RULES AMERICA?
(1967); DAVID M. RIccI, COMMUNITY POWER AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1971).
295 See, e.g., STEVEN L. ELKIN, CITY AND REGIME IN THE AMERICAN REPUB-
LIC (1987); CLARENCE N. STONE, REGIME POLITICS: GOVERNING ATLANTA,
1947-1980 (1989).
" See supra note 78.
29 This viewpoint is valid today. See JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON
TuLLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEMOCRACY 120-24 (1962); WILLIAM RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL
COALITIONS 102-23 (1962).
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Guinier says, a "wasted vote.1298 The same person living in a
black district might feel assured that her representative would
be part of a minority coalition as long as the legislative body
votes along racial lines.299
I am not persuaded that black representatives elected
through cumulative voting or other semi-proportional schemes
will be effective in representing the interests of their constitu-
ents as long as they are in a numerical minority and issues are
defined in terms of race. Their power to negotiate or become
part of a majority coalition will continue to be a function of
numerical strength. Nevertheless, cumulative voting in an
electoral process will still serve minorities better than single-
member districts.
Cumulative voting may eventually serve to make local
legislatures and governing boards more diverse and pluralistic.
In the short run, cumulative voting may help improve the
representation of minorities, especially those that are small in
number, such as Hispanics, Asians, Native Americans, and
gays. Most important of all, cumulative voting will provide
minorities with choices - choices about defining their own
interests, choices about joining political coalitions, choices about
no longer being part of a permanent political minority. Cumula-
tive voting will permit protected populations to take advantage
of the transitory nature of interest-group politics, and more
regularly enjoy the opportunity to be part of a majority coali-
tion.
The goal is full integration into the political and social
fabric of the community, not the homogenization of politics or
society nor the suppression of a black or minority political
agenda. Under cumulative voting, blacks and other minorities
can vote along racial lines as it suits their interests, and several
protected groups might vote as a block when they see fit to do
s Guinier, supra note 252, at 1594.
This is not to say that all or most votes come down along racial lines.
Black legislators often vote along party lines with their white colleagues.
Guinier does not have much confidence in such coalitions because she thinks
that white legislators from single-member districts do not have much of an
incentive to work with black members from single-member districts and
therefore leave it to the minority legislators to compromise the interests of
their constituents. See No Two Seats, supra note 232. Guinier believes that
legislators who are elected by cumulative voting and chosen by a unified
constituency can represent interests more effectively. See Race Conscious
Districting, supra note 251, at 1632-41.
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so. The key is the expansion of individual and group options.
Individuals should be given the opportunity to make real choices
about politics without compromising. If I am a black man
wanting to live in a racially integrated community, I should not
have to throw away my vote to do so. Perhaps, by living within
a diverse community, my neighbors and I will someday decide
upon a political agenda without introducing the topic of racial
rivalry and the consequential animosity that keeps America
divided into two separate and unequal societies.
CONCLUSION
A review of the thirty-year history of the Voting Rights Act
indicates that courts now define individual and group rights
more broadly and enforce these rights more aggressively. The
definition of voting rights progressed from the elimination of
practices that denied individuals the basic franchise to the
definition of group rights designed to assure minorities repre-
sentation in governmental bodies. The application of sophisti-
cated social science techniques assisted the courts in identifying
violations of the law and in fashioning remedies to remove
violations.
At-large voting systems, once a major target of litigation,
have now been replaced by single-member districting schemes.
A substantial body of empirical research, however, indicates
that single-member districting plans do not help all protected
groups in a similar fashion. These schemes may compromise
the level of representation enjoyed by Hispanics, Asians, Native
Americans, and even blacks when they do not constitute a
strong numerical majority in a jurisdiction or are geographically
dispersed. Moreover, single-member districting plans, and the
racial gerrymandering that often accompanies them, involve the
courts in intrusive public policy that disrupts local government
practices, imposes limits on voter choice, and polarizes commu-
nities along racial lines.
Given recent action by the courts to limit the scope of racial
gerrymandering, cumulative voting provides voting rights
activists with a legal stategy that incurs less risk of being
successfully challenged. The evidence indicates that using
cumulative voting in at-large electoral systems constitutes a
viable alternative to single-member districts. Cumulative voting
provides meaningful participation and choice to all groups and
does not require the courts to become as enmeshed in the
political process. Cumulative voting facilitates the transitory
nature of group politics so that, notwithstanding the high level
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of racial consciousness that shapes the American political
culture, protected groups need not be relegated to minority
status in such a graphic and lasting way. Ultimately, cumula-
tive voting is more likely to promote the political and social
integration of American society without undermining the public
agenda of any group.

